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Food and agribusiness in the U.S is a dynamic and ever changing business. The 
industry has seen booms and busts, considerable consolidation, and continued 
globalization in the past few decades. Businesses operating within its sectors have had 
   	  
  	 		 	  	     		 consolidates at 
the consumer, supplier, and producer level. One strategy companies have used to grow 
and position themselves throughout years of industry consolidation has been merger 
and acquisition (M&A) transactions.  
During the eleven years from 1985 and 1995, the food industry was listed in the 
top 10 M&A most active industries ten times. It was counted in the top five for six of 
those years (Adelaja et al. 1999). This highlights the significance M&A has played in food 
and agribusiness. Despite the prevalence of M&A, there exists much dispute on the 
value of it, and whether it is beneficial to shareholders at all. The impact of M&A on 
	 	 	 	 
	 
 	  		    		 
announcement is the focus of this paper. 
M&A transactions are analyzed in the short and long run according to the 
		   		  
 	  		  	   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impact is further analyzed using changes in financial performance following a 
transaction. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market and market adjusted 
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normal returns models. Generalized sign z and Patell z statistical tests were used to 
analyze cumulative abnormal returns over multiple event windows. The conclusions of 
this paper focus on the 0-1 day event window and the calculations are subject to 
backdating. Average cumulative abnormal returns for acquirer shareholders were found 
to be roughly 1% following a transaction s announcement for the 0-1 day event window, 
while target shareholders reported a 17% gain. Both results were statistically significant 
at the .05 or less level. 
Long run buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for acquirers were measured 
over the event window -1 to 36 months following a transaction s announcement. The 
market adjusted model reported a mean loss of 7.6% for acquirer shareholders during 
this time period. Detrimental long run performance is further supported by the analysis 
of financial metric changes in acquirer firms during the years following a transaction. 
Asset turnover, debt to equity, and return on equity were found to be lower on average 
in the years following a transaction than prior.  
Lastly, OLS regressions were used to examine drivers of abnormal returns. 
Acquirer abnormal return regressions report variables reflecting acquirer return on 
assets, target return on assets, cash transactions, and transactions in the food and 
beverage retailing industry as all statistically significant factors impacting acquirer return. 
Coefficients for transactions in food and beverage retailing as well as cash transactions 
were positive. Acquirer and target ROA variables had negative coefficients in acquirer 
return OLS regressions. Target abnormal return regressions report variables reflecting 
cash transactions, hostile transaction, and competitive transactions as all statistically 
significant factors impacting returns. The coefficients on these variables were positive. 
Short run market and market adjusted model abnormal returns were found to be very 
correlated and differ greatly only in long run calculated returns.  
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION TO MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS  
1.1 Motivation  M&A Transactions in the World Today 
On December 11, 2015, DuPont and Dow Chemical announced an all-stock 
merger of equals. The intention of this merger was to create one large company that 
would spin-off three independent companies over the next two years. However, an 
  	
           	 
DuPont shares down 26.8% and Dow Chemical down 24.4% (Neely 2016). Although part 
of this decline in value is certainly driven by an economic recession in the industries 
within which DuPont and Dow Chemical operate, the overall investor pessimism is 
rather surprising given the synergies and strategic benefits of the deal; for example, the 
resultant ag focused spinoff of the merger will control over a 40% share of the U.S. corn 
seeds and related genetics sector (Neely 2016). 
The Dow/DuPont deal is set to change the landscape of certain subsections in 
the agricultural industry. Furthermore, this transaction represents only one example of 
a slew of mergers and acquisitions that have shaken the food and agribusiness sectors 
over the last few years. In addition to the Dow and DuPont transaction, several other 
large deals have occurred. The world's largest pork processor and hog producer, 
Smithfield Foods, was purchased by the Chinese company Shuanghui International 
Holdings in late 2013. Tyson Foods purchased Hillshire Brands in 2014; and less than a 
year later consumer food giants Kraft and Heinz announced their own intention to 
merge. These transactions foretell of coming changes to the food and agribusiness 
sectors, industries which are no strangers to transformation. Merger and acquisition 
(M&A) waves have revolutionized and restructured these industries several times in the 
last few decades and continue to prompt change and adaption today.
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 To gain insight into the importance M&A has had historically, one needs only to 
review the transactions that characterize the fourth, fifth, and sixth merger waves1.  
Often times macro events and policy changes precipitate these waves, but regardless of 
the factors that initiate them each wave      	

 
     
 
the food and agribusiness sectors by researchers, businessmen, and investors. For 
example, during the eleven years and two waves that span 1985-1995, the food industry 
alone was included among the top 10 M&A most active industries ten times. It was 
counted in the top five for six of those years (Adelaja et al. 1999).  






















  commonly used 
inorganic and strategic growth method of companies across the globe. Over 44,000 
transactions valuing more than 4.5 trillion US dollars were cited worldwide in 2015 
alone (IMMA 2016).  This has helped establish the field of M&A as a continued interest 




1.2 Problem Statement 
David Fubini, Colin Price, and Maurizio Zollo, the authors of Mergers: Leadership, 
Performance, and Corporate Health, identify the goal of every M&A transaction as 
rooted in the pursuit of generating or protecting company value. However, many factors 
make it difficult to determine in a given M&A transaction the extent to which each of 


















segment value created from an acquisition and value intrinsic to the original company in 




















                                                     
1 Although disputes regarding the existence and length of waves exist, they are largely identified by the 
following time periods: first wave, 1893-1904; second wave, 1919-1929; third wave, 1955-1970; fourth 
wave, 1974-1989; fifth wave, 1993-2000; sixth wave, 2003-2008; seventh wave, 2011-present. 
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differing and even opposing conclusions about the value generation of a merger or 
acquisitions can be determined. 
 Commonly, specific segments or subsets of the larger body of M&A transactions 
have been found to be unique or divergent in their average value creation. However, 
 	 

         -creation for 
both acquiring and target company shareholders is a contentious debate. Questions 
concerning the extent common factors impact value continue. Indeed, some researchers 
have questioned whether M&A creates value at all. These inquires have been posed to 
general M&A transactions, particular companies, and specific industries.  
This paper seeks to provide insights into the problem of ambiguity regarding 
whether M&A transactions in the food and agribusiness industry create or destroy value 
and evaluate the extent to which attributes like relative size, deal value, and industry 
influence the returns of target and acquirer shareholders. Long run performance 
changes of acquirers are also examined. Specifically, transactions will be assessed using 
shareholder returns for the acquiring and target companies. Normal return models are 
compared with realized returns to isolate the impact of a transactions announcement.  
The analysis conducted seeks to capture both the short and long run impact of M&A 
transactions to shareholder interests as well as provide insight into the long run 
performance of acquirers. Given the complex nature of mergers and acquisitions, the 
dynamic nature of the food and agribusiness sectors, and the strong precedents of prior 
research in the field of M&A, an overview of company valuation approaches, historical 
industry and sector idiosyncrasies, and established methods of M&A analysis is provided 
in Chapter 2  the literature review. 
 
 
1.3 Hypotheses & Stages of Analysis 
The goal of this paper is to explore the value created by mergers and acquisitions 
in the agriculture, food and beverage, food and beverage retailing, and tobacco 
industries. Two normal return models are used to analyze the impact M&A transaction 
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announcements have on investor returns of acquiring and target companies. Company 
returns are examined over long and short event windows and tested for significance. 
Individual company returns are later regressed upon to elicit and quantify driving 
influencers of value. An examination of long run changes in performance of acquirers is 
included to supplement shortcomings of long run abnormal return analysis. Figure 1 
displays a broad outline of the processes and steps through which the conclusions of 
this paper are obtained. Four main stages or processes are identified in development of 
the final conclusions reached in this study. The stages are as follows: stage 1, data 
collection processes; stage 2, event study and abnormal return calculations; stage 3, OLS 
regressions; and stage 4, long run acquirer performance analysis. Each section builds on 
the prior conclusions of the previous stage or is used to justify the approaches and 
analysis of later sections. Several distinct hypotheses have been identified and the 
analysis of this paper will focus specifically on them. The hypotheses have been grouped 
according to the stages and chapter within which they are addressed. A comprehensive 
analysis of all hypotheses and the general conclusions of this paper is provided in the 
conclusion of this paper   Chapter 8. 
Stage 2, Chapter 5: Testing Presence of Abnormal Returns 




Hypothesis 2: Acquirer subsets will not vary in the short run reported average returns 
according to the relative size, value, and industry characteristics of the transaction. 




Hypothesis 4: Target subsets will not vary in the short run reported average returns 
according to the relative size, value, and industry characteristics of the transaction. 




Hypothesis 6: Acquirer subsets will not vary in the long run reported average returns 
according to the relative size, value, and industry characteristics of the transaction. 
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Stage 3, Chapter 6: Testing Significance of Drivers of Abnormal Return 
Hypothesis 7: Acquirer abnormal returns are not significantly impacted by industry. 
Hypothesis 8: Acquirer and target abnormal returns are not significantly impacted by 
relative size of the transaction. 
Hypothesis 9: Acquirer and target abnormal returns are not significantly impacted by 
deal value of the transaction. 
Hypothesis 10: Acquirer and target abnormal returns are not significantly impacted 
when the transac  	
  
     
Hypothesis 11: Hostile transactions will not have an impact on the returns of targets. 
Hypothesis 12: Target abnormal returns are not significantly impacted when multiple 
bidders are present. 
Stage 4, Chapter 7: Examining Long Run Financial Performance of Acquirers 
Hypothesis 13: Acquirer current ratios are decreased in the long run. 
Hypothesis 14: Acquirer asset turnover are decreased in the long run. 
Hypothesis 15: Acquirer total debt ratios are decreased in the long run. 
Hypothesis 16: Acquirer return on equity are decreased in the long run. 
These hypotheses are posed with the intent of providing clarity while building on 
prior literature and foundational economic principles. For example, the first hypothesis 
that M&A transactions create value for acquirers is built off the notion that the 
occurrence of M&A transactions and the assumption companies operate rationally 
imply M&A transactions must be more likely to benefit the acquirer. Were this not the 
  fffi  fl ffi     !   "  fi#
destroy value, but rather there is more opportunity than risk incentivizing the 
occurrence of M&A transactions.  The next hypothesis, hypothesis 2, is included to 
examine whether the opportunity and risk associated with transactions vary according 
to particular attributes. Different market sectors may vary in their structure and have 
inherently unique risks which may interact with the returns experienced by acquirer or 
target firms. Deals of larger value or relative size may also alter the risk and return of 
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the parties involved. These notions have been supported by prior studies and are 
further elaborated upon in the literature review.  
Hypotheses 3 and 4 are similar to the first two, but focus on analyzing the 
experience of target firm shareholders. Unlike acquirers, it is far more likely that these 
firms should experience significant returns as acquirers should often have to incentivize 
participation with a premium. Although a premium or positive return may be strongly 
expected as target firms do not bear many of the risks in a transaction, questions 
regarding the significance of such returns prompts the third hypothesis. Hypothesis 4 
mirrors hypothesis 2 in its inquiry into the returns of different market segments or 
transaction groups of target firms. 
The last two hypotheses in the stage 2 section explore the long run experiences 
of acquiring firm investors. Similar to hypotheses 1 & 2 or 3 & 4, these hypotheses 
examine the general returns of acquirer sub segments in the long run. They are unique, 
however, as they include adjustments to stock prices following the actual transaction 
instead of just the announcement. The returns, thus, measure in part the actual impact 
of a transaction rather than just the markets speculation following a transactions 
announcement.  
Hypotheses 7-12 of stage three rely on the results of OLS regressions. These 
regressions are discussed in the methodology section, but the variables included in 
them are used to test and quantify the impact certain drivers have on abnormal returns 
experienced by shareholders. The dependent variable regressed upon are the returns 
calculated for each transaction in stage 2. Because they are built upon each other, the 
conclusions of stage 2 hypotheses influence the credibility of the conclusions of stage 3. 
The last four hypotheses act to supplement the long run analysis of acquirer 
returns. The models and approaches used to calculate abnormal returns lose much of 
their power in long run analysis. This will be further discussed in the literature review, 
but the analysis of changing performance metrics in firms that participate in M&A 
transactions allows for new insights and an additional viewpoint of the impact M&A 
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transactions have on acquirers. These hypotheses do not however, lend themselves to 





































1.4 Conclusion  
This paper seeks to elaborate on current perceptions of mergers and acquisition 
in the context of food and agribusiness. Recent consolidation trends and market 
restructuring has brought M&A in these industries into the spotlight. However, research 
papers into the particular returns of acquirers and targets specific to this industry are 
limited. The ideas expressed in this paper are intended to help cultivate a better 
understanding of these returns in researchers and businessmen alike.  
Sixteen hypotheses are listed, but the insights provided are not limited to the 
conclusions of these inquiries. Many trends or unexpected characteristics arise 
throughout the progression of the paper and, depending on their applicability, are 
addressed. Others are left for future researchers to explore. As with all research, there 
exist limitations to the models, approaches, and analyses of this paper and these 
limitations are address and conveyed as clearly as possible to the reader throughout the 
paper. 
Lastly, analysis and hypotheses addressed in this paper are chosen for their 
applicability to the paper s intended readers. Multiple approaches are used to maximize 
the accuracy of the conclusions listed. Ideally, this paper will provide a foundation for 
those without prior knowledge of the role of M&A and new insights to those with a 
mastery of the field. The next section will elaborate on the findings of prior studies and 





CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Valuation processes, Markets and Event Studies 
 There are four predominant methods for company valuation: discounted cash 
flow valuation, liquidation and accounting valuation, relative valuation, and contingent 
claim valuation   	

        ff
and the difficulties that must be overcome calculating this value is itself an area of study 
which has garnered a significant amount of research. Furthermore, the continued 
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difficult task2. Multiple processes through which investors calculate a  ff
are discussed in this paper, but most analysis conducted places the task of valuing the 
companies studied on the market. It does this by using stock price data surrounding the 
        ff  the views of financial 
markets. The assumption of market efficiency is implicit. Even so, the common valuation 
approaches are reviewed as markets are driven according to the valuation conclusions 
of investors using the approaches outlined in the following paragraphs. 
The approaches used by a researcher to measure worth or value of a company 
are important because the method employed can greatly impact the results concluded. 
Without an accurate method to determine the initial value of a company and its post-
transaction value, no meaningful inferences can be drawn from the transaction. If the 
method is not comprehensive -- capable of capturing the multitude of factors that drive 
profits and subsequently value -- the insights of the study will be limited. In the most 
                                                     
2 !"# $"#% &'("#$)*&"' "' #)'+"$ ,)-. */%"#0 1%% 23#*"' 4)-.&%-51 1%$&')- 6789 ,"#. A Random Walk 
Down Wall Street  
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  finding could provide errant results or a conclusion that does not 
accurately reflect the true nature of the transactions studied. Depending on the goals of 
a study, a researcher may also need to give consideration to an approach where 
changes in worth systemic to the original firm and those driven by the transaction are 
clearly separable.  
 
 
2.1.1 Discounted Cash Flows 
Valuation methods attempt to relate value to the level of uncertainty 
surrounding expected future cash flows. This is most clearly seen in the discounted cash 
flows method. Quite simply, this approach claims the value of an asset should be the 
present value of the expected cash flows of the asset discounted back at a rate that 
reflects the riskiness of each cash flow. This approach is widely praised but requires the 




2.1.2 Liquidation and Accounting Valuation 
 Liquidation and accounting valuation are primarily driven by the notion that a 
business is comprised of assets and the value of the assets should sum to the value of 
the business. This approach works well for large established businesses in developed 
markets where growth opportunities are not readily available. The shortcoming in this 
method comes from the fact that many investors ascribe value to the potential for 
growth in both a company and its cash flows. This potential for growth may involve 
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-based valuations will yield 
lower values than going concern valuations3 
 
 
2.1.3 Relative Valuation 
Relative valuation involves the valuation of an asset based on how comparable 
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  
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market pricing of similar stocks. Often times financial ratios pertaining to variables like 
	





true value. Damodaran (2006) again identifies three steps to relative valuation:  finding 
comparable assets that are priced by the market, scaling the market prices to a common 
variable, and adjusting for differences across assets.  
Liu, Nissim and Thomas (2002) provide insights into the accuracy and 
employment of common multiples in pricing over 19,000 firm-year observations 
spanning seventeen years following 1982. They identify multiples capturing forecasted 
earnings per share perform best in explaining pricing differences, while sales multiples 
suffer inaccuracy. It should be noted that if the market is correct in its pricing of stocks, 
discounted cash flow and re
 
	  	   
   

derived. Lastly, most valuations are considered to fall under the classification of a 
relative valuation. Damodaran (2002) notes that almost 90% of equity research 
valuations and 50% of acquisition valuations rely on inferences drawn from multiples 
and comparable companies. They are thus relative valuations. This claim is not extended 
to academic research on the impact of M&A, but rather the speculative processes by 
which transaction deal values are negotiated in the market. 
 
 
                                                     
3 Going concern value is the value of a business that is expected to continue operating into the future as 
opposed to the value of its liquidated assets. 
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2.1.4 Contingent Claim Valuation 
 The last method, contingent claim valuation, uses option pricing models to 
measure the value of assets that share option characteristics. This method and the 
models employed in it has arguably seen the most development in recent years 
following the Black-Scholes pricing model in 1973. However, it is an approach not widely 
used in the analysis of M&A. Contingent claim valuation has been mainly praised for its 
ability to better model companies given particular circumstances. For example, 
Damodaran (2006) suggests   	





























 It may more aply 
be described using contingent claim analysis. Despite this, contingent claim valuation 
use in the general M&A analysis is minimal as other approaches have been preferred by 
academia and industry alike. 
 
 
2.1.5 Stock Price Adjustments and Market Efficiency  
Literature regarding M&A transactions can outsource the valuation process by 
assuming market efficiency and accuracy. This is perhaps the most common practice in 
academic research. Using the prices of public company stocks following the 
announcement of an M&A transaction, researchers can gain insight into the perceived 
value generation investors believe will occur. This is usually done through the use of an 
event study. The event study methodology is largely built on a foundational paper 
authored by Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll in 1969. Their work, titled The Adjustment of 
Stock Prices to New Information, focuses on common stock price adjustment following 
the release of information regarding a stock split. Implicitly, event study methodology is 
heavily influenced by capital market perceptions of value. The realized or actual impact 






















market value accurately according to the information available to investors. It is 
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investors, then, who utilize valuation techniques and the open market to determine a 
  	 
  
   	 
Event study methodology has been used to analyze the impact of many kinds of 
informational releases in addition to M&A related events.  Pivotal to an event study 
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occurred had the event not happened. It is with the normal returns estimated by a 
normal returns model that abnormal returns, returns not prompted by ordinary market 

	     	   	 
methodology, its application in M&A research, and its use in this paper are further 
discussed in section 2.4 and Chapter 4. 
 
 
2.2 Food and Agribusiness M&A 
  Given the number of M&A transactions in the food and agribusiness industry 
during the last few M&A waves, there have been a number of publications concerning 
the state and future of M&A in agriculture. Several unique characteristics of the food 
and agribusiness industries have been historical driving factors of M&A and the focus of 
many publications. The food and agribusiness sectors, particularly the agribusiness 
sector, are prone to cyclical boom and bust periods. These periods can lead to changes 
in farm income, land values, and financial structuring as farmers adjust how they fund 
their projects. Cash flush periods for farmers can lead to similar prosperity for those 
who supply products and services for farmers, and this in turn can lead to industry 
conditions that prompt M&A activity. 
 
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develop cash flush periods suggest they should be viewed as a separable entity from 
other M&A literature. This flushness is often most visible in company free cash flows. By 
definition, free cash flow is cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that 
have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital (Jenson 
1986). This surplus of cash flow and its relation to M&A has led to the development of 
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the free cash flow theory of takeovers. The theory presented is motivated by the idea 
that cash flush companies may be prone to participate in M&A due to managerial rather 
than shareholder interests. This can cause a significant agency cost -- a cost born by 
hiring an entity to act on behalf of shareholders -- occurs through M&A because 
common managerial interests may not align with what is optimal for shareholders. This 
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allocation of excess funds. Managers may prioritize company growth in order to benefit 
from increased personal power and compensation instead of returning excess cash to 
investors (Jenson 1986). This incentive to grow can lead to value destroying pursuits. As 
Jenson states regarding his observations of business practices in th   
 
Conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers over [dividend]   
payout policies are especially severe when the organization generates 
substantial free cash flow. The problem is how to motivate managers to  
disgorge the cash rather than investing it at below the cost of capital or     








    fffi

 fl
mergers also appear to reflect the expenditure of free cash flow. The industry 
apparently generates large cash flows with few growth opportunities (
 ffi !"#$
Likewise, an article published in the New York Times identifies tobacco, forestry, food, 
and oil as industries where large free cash flows and agency problems were prophesied 
to lead to an increase in takeovers and overall industry restructuring (Jenson B 1986). 
A more general perspective of the motives for M&A transactions in the food 
industry is provided by Goldberg (1983). He suggests M&A transactions are driven by 
factors relating to size, growth, economies of scale, profitability, market share, market 
power, synergy, diversification, tax incentives, and managerial hubris. Specifically 
concerning the transactions of the fourth wave during the 1980 Declerk (1992) 
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suggests that managerial and operational synergy motivations can be main drivers. This 
  	 
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food sector.  
Lastly, the overall continuous consolidation of food and agribusiness firms in the 
last few decades has not gone unnoted. Publications covering the consolidation process 
may not strictly focus on M&A as it relates to the consolidation phenomenon, but the 
overall structural change it has impacted on sub-sectors comprising the food and 
agribusiness industries have been noted. There is no doubt M&A has worked as a vessel 
to facilitate this change. This claim is evidenced by Marion and Kim (1991) who show 
mergers and acquisitions played a major role in the concentration of six selected food 
industries. They identify M&A as the causal agent for two-thirds of the increase in four-
firm concentration between 1977 and 1988. This consolidation as well as the role of 
M&A is recognized also by Boehlje (2002) and exemplified in his observations regarding 
the concentration of production to a limited number of firms in the food processing, 
food retailing, ag machine, and poultry industries  often with five or less companies 
controlling a lion share of the market.  
Firm level data has been used to analyze and predict the role companies play in 
larger, macro trend phenomenon. For example, research has been done to identify the 
firm level factors that influence the likelihood for a company to be targeted and taken 
over (Adelaja et al. 1999). Adelaja and his co-authors use public firm data to suggest 
that firm liquidity, debt or leverage, profitability, sales growth, stock earnings capacity, 
and market-to-book ratio are all important factors in determining the likelihood that a 
firm is pursued as a M&A takeover target. Additional findings of their research suggest 
that the attitude surrounding the transaction, number of prior bids, and degree of 
officer control are important factors to whether a takeover is successful. The two 




















Firm level data has also been used to examine the changes to shareholder value 
of food and agribusiness companies following a transaction. Declerck (1992) found 
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acquiring firm shareholders to have marginal benefits while target firms in high 
concertation food industry segments could earn up to 9% above normal returns and a 
15% premium on market price due to accquirer efficiency and market power gains 
prompted by the transaction.  
Agricultural biotechnology mergers and their impact on competition are 
examined using two large scale mergers and event study methodology in King, Wilson, 
and Naseem (2002). The two transactions were selected and analyzed with the intent of 
providing insight and motivation toward biotechnology industry consolidation that 
   	
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return according to the market model to one firm and a positive abnormal return to the 
other. Overall, the paper focuses more on the competitive nature and impact M&A can 
have on a consolidated industry as a whole, particularly when an industry is dominated 
by several large firms. 
 
 
2.3 Impacts of M&A on Acquirers vs Targets 
 
 
2.3.1 Acquirer Impact Summary 
There are a number of publications that seek to determine the question of 
whether M&A transactions provide benefits to acquiring firms on average. Although 
intuition would suggest that the acquiring firms must benefit or M&A would not occur, 
the empirical evidence largely, though not exclusively, suggest that M&A transactions 
destroy value for acquiring shareholders. This is supported by Kengelbach and Roos 
(2011) of the Boston Consulting Group who studied approximately 26,000 transactions 
completed between 1988 and 2010 and found acquirers to most often have slightly 
negative returns following the announcement of an acquisition. An article published in 
the Harvard Business Review states the failure rate of acquisition in most studies is 
between 70 and 90% (Christenson et. al. 2011). One possible reason for the poor 
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success rate has been di    	 
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        
theory and agency problems in the prior section.  
 It is important to remember that many factors can drive the returns experienced 
by acquiring shareholders. The goal of an acquirer -- to generate more value than cost 
incurred during a transaction  is very ambitious and bears the risk in a transaction since 
most of the value generation hinges on the uncertain predictions made by the acquirer. 
Commonly, researchers will try to find trends by grouping acquirers of similar size, 
industry, or nationality. Likewise, transactions are often broken down by specific 
characteristics such as target to acquirer relative size, cross border classification, and 
method of payment by acquirer. Different sub-segments of the overall body of M&A 
transactions have been found to have varying returns. Several key studies and their 
findings regarding acquirer returns are discussed below and showcase how particular 
acquirers have surpassed the odds and generated value using M&A. 
A study by Gao & Sudarsanam (2003) found M&A transactions create value for 
the acquirers observed. Specifically, Sudarsanam & Gao found that high tech 
acquisitions can be value creating for both parties when transactions are constrained to 
high tech firms. The authors, however, do acknowledge that high tech acquisition firms 
in the years they studied (1990s) largely underperformed industry peers and 
comparably sized companies who shared similar book-to-market ratios. They provide 
additional information regarding less quantitative components of M&A analysis by 
highlighting a negative relationship between managerial shareholdings and post-
acquisition performance in the high tech sector. This brings to light the increasingly 
popular notion that non-financial factors like managerial hubris and human error 
prompt or motivate bad transactions. They conclude their analysis by finding that high 
managerial ownership reduces risk aversion and can lead to overinvestment when 
acquiring an industry related company. 
 A second pivotal paper showcases both an uncommon, accounting based 
analysis approach as well as suggests that high value transactions are different in the 
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returns they provide to acquirers. Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) analyze the post-
acquisition perfo   	
  	      	
  
   -tax 
operating cash flow scaled by total asset to measure performance. Their analysis, which 
compared the performance of the combined post-merger firm to the sum of the 
acquiring and target firm prior to the transaction showed a significant post-merger 
performance increase. According to their analysis, 70% of firms showed above-average 
performance. Also identified was a strong relationship between stock return and 
realized cash flow returns.  
 Lastly, size and market structure seem to be influential factors to acquirer 
returns. Kim and Singal (1993) and Singal (1996) examine airline company mergers in 
the USA. Their studies found increased market power and efficiency following an M&A 
transaction. Abnormal stock returns were linked to the changes in profitability 
experienced by the companies, supporting the view that the stock market anticipated 
profit changes. Their publications suggest transactions that impact market structure 
provide better returns than general M&A. This study is notable because its results may 
be applicable to other capital-intensive, limited competitor product sectors like those in 
    
    fffifl  ffi	  	
  !! 	
be value generating and value to be tied to relative size of the target to acquirer. They 
reported a combined average target and bidder return of 3.5% at the announcement of 
an acquisition.  Their work analyzed 1,305 firms across 59 identified industries. 
Mullheron and Boone also analyzed divestitures in their research and found that such 
transactions could also provide positive returns. 
 "# $ 	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	 ffi  s struggle to create the value needed 
to cover premiums paid in M&A transactions. Each transaction is different, however, 
and sweeping generalizations cannot capture the circumstance of every deal. Prior 





2.3.2 Target Impact Summary 
 The returns to shareholders of target firms are consistently found to be positive 
and significant. This makes intuitive sense since the shareholders of a targeted company 
must be incentivized to participate in a transaction. This incentive is most clearly seen in 
the premium above the traded stock price offered to a public M&A target. The idea that 
target companies win in a transaction may not be questioned, but many have sought to 
quantify the return and identify drivers of it.   
A survey of Jensen and Ruback (1983) summarizes the results of 13 empirical 
studies covering transactions from 1956 to 1981. The target   	 
    























































































actual drivers of target returns from M&A activities, less intuitive conclusions have been 
drawn. For example, poorer performance in targeted banks may lead to higher 
abnormal returns for target shareholders following a transaction
	
s announcement 
(Beitel & Wahrenburg 2002). This may be partly due to the models used to determine 
return, but the idea is not outlandish on its own. The notion is that poorly managed 
companies may hold greater opportunity for an efficient acquirer.  Beitel & Wahrenburg 





















































Therefore, poorly run companies are more attractive to acquirers because assets are 
underutilized, and this appeal has a tangible impact on target shareholder returns. 
Identifying trends in targets of M&A transactions is at least as difficult as 
examining acquirers and may in fact be the greater challenge. This is because targets 
respond to the offers of an acquirer, and the offer of an acquirer is commonly driven by 
factors exogenous to the target. Still, there are certain characteristics like target ROA 
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that have been identified to influence target shareholder returns. Furthermore, target 
models like the one presented by Adalaja (see the Food and Agribusiness M&A section) 
suggest there is a nature or commonality to targets of M&A. 
 
 
2.4 M&A in Event Study Literature 
 
 
2.4.1 General Overview of M&A in Event Studies  
 In the general body of M&A analysis, a particular method deserves extended 
focus and discussion. Since the initial emergence of event study methodology, the 
number of publications using this analytical approach has increased at a seemingly 
exponential rate. Just ten years ago Kothari and Warner (2006), recognized over 500 
event studies published during the years 1974 through 2000. They go on to discussed 
many of the basics of event study methodology and reaffirmed the idea that much of 
the original concepts have not changed since its introduction.  
 At its core, an event study is the estimated difference in market returns between 
what occurred and what would have been experienced had an event not happened. 






to market movements, normal returns of a stock during an event window can be 
predicted. The returns can then be compared to the realized returns experienced to 
gain insight into the impact of the event. The actual returns experienced less the normal 
returns calculated provide the abnormal returns attributed to an event. Graphically, the 
event study methodology is captured in Figure 2. Specific normal models and event 
window lengths can vary from study to study, but the general event study methodology 
is the same. MacKinlay (1997) and Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) discuss the 
origins and breadth of event study particularities. The relation of event studies to tests 
                                                     
4 Estimation Window: a period over which parameters are estimated. 
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of market efficiency is reviewed in Fama (1991). Again, it is imperative to understand 
that conclusions drawn from event studies using financial data reflect investor 




Figure 2: Event Study Timeline 
 
 
2.4.2 Short Run Event Studies 
The period length over which an event is analyzed is the most widely used 
attribute for segmenting event study publications. Studies are typically designated 
either long or short run. Although there is no specific numeric time length separating 
short and long run event studies, the general accepted rule is to categorize studies 
concerned with periods longer than one year as long-run. This is not to say that others 
have not used stricter definitions as contemporary research has had greater access to 
more periodic daily or intraday data. 
Short run event studies are relatively problem free and straightforward. Many 
researchers are quite comfortable with the process of valuing the market reaction to 
new information over the short run. It is easy to isolate the effect of a single event on a 
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is minimal. Analysis of a transaction becomes increasingly difficult over longer periods of 
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  fffifl ffi  ed most publications 
to use data spanning no more than a few months surrounding an event. Thus the 
relationship between realized returns and the event in question is clearest. Overall, 
event study methodology does not come to drastically different conclusions regarding 
the impact of M&A from other analysis methods, but event studies have a particular 
advantage in their ability to test numerous firms in an easy, pragmatic manner with 
minimal data requirements. 
Recent developments and shifts in the conceptual framework of short run event 
studies are limited mostly to the emergence of intraday studies in high frequency 
 fl ffi
  
   knowledge, data this periodic has not been used to study M&A. 
Tests for statistical significance in short run event studies have become more 
sophisticated, but this development has had far stronger implications for their long-run 
counterparts (Kothari and Warner 2006). Common statistical tests for short run event 
studies are presented by Patell (1976) and Cowan (1992). Their standardized cumulative 




2.4.3 Long Run Event Studies 
Long-run event studies are subject to much greater concern and have been far 
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d Tsai, 1999). This 
condemnation is largely driven by several biases and perhaps fatal issues that arise in 
long run event studies that are avoidable or negligible in their short run counterparts.  
The most notable issue in long run event studies is whether or not the abnormal 
returns calculated in an event study can reasonably be tied to the event. Concerns of  
whether abnormal returns are driven more by initial mispricing of a stock or the M&A 
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transaction observed are not clearly answered. This unpleasant truth is captured by 
Kothari and Warner (2006) as they state the following regarding long run studies: 
 
Whether the apparent abnormal returns are due to mispricing, or simply          
the result of measurement problems, is a contentious and unresolved issue 
among financial economists. The methodological research in the area is 
important because it demonstrates how easy it is to conclude there is     
abnormal performance when none exists. Before questions on mispricing         
can be answered, better methods than currently exist are required. 
 
Furthermore, the possibility that abnormal returns may be driven by mispricing 
is made irrelevant if risk adjustment is necessary. Many firms may not be characterized 
by a stationary risk factor years after an event. Normal return models that use an 
estimation window to calculate a risk beta may not accurately capture the proper 
normal returns years after an event. This inaccuracy could cause an inflation in 
abnormal returns reported. This is particularly true if the event structurally changes the 
risk of the firm. Short run returns are not greatly influenced by an incorrect beta, but 
long run analysis using an improper risk estimator can cause substantial flaws. If this 
were not enough, a correct risk estimator is still dependent on the validity of the 
    	 
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which expected return model is correct, and therefore estimates of abnormal returns 







Even placing aside these noted issues, there are many more difficulties to 
overcome. Long-run studies usually make use of the buy and hold return (BHAR) metric 
for determining abnormal returns. The mathematical calculation of this return is 
discussed in the methodology section, but it has been argued as the most appropriate 
approach for the long run studies because it more closely aligns with the actual 
experience of investors (Roll 1983). Furthermore, the BHAR approach avoids biases 
arising from security microstructure issues in portfolios subject to frequent rebalancing 
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(Blume and Stambaugh 1983) (Roll, 1983). Even so, the buy and hold method is not 
without its limitations. 
 Lyon and Barber (1996) identify the use of long run buy and hold returns as still 
subject to new listing, rebalancing, and skewness biases. A new listing bias arises 
because abnormal returns of long run event studies must utilize firms with available 
long post-event history return data while firms that constitute the portfolio index of 
such studies may include new firms that begin trading subsequent to the event. A 
rebalancing bias occurs because compound returns of a reference portfolio, such as an 
equally weighted market index, are typically calculated assuming periodic rebalancing, 
while the returns of sample firms are compounded without rebalancing. Lastly, a 
skewness bias occurs because long run abnormal returns are inherently positively 
skewed. This is easily understood since stock returns are bounded below by -100% (loss 
of all value) but limitless in their potential to generate cumulative positive returns. 
Barber and Lyon suggest the use of control firms for detecting long-run abnormal stock 
returns. The criteria they use to create a control firm portfolio is dependent on firm size 
and book-to-market ratios, and their reported test statistics are well-specified in this 
approach. As they note, this setup negates or limits the impact of new listings, 
rebalancing, and skewness to some extent, but problems in power still persist. 
 The problem of long run skewness is further addressed by Arnold R. Cowan and 
Anne M. A. Sergeant (1996), who analyze the impact small sample sizes can have on 
skewness and returns. They observe many prior publications have used extremely small 
sample sizes ranging from 385 to 2216 transactions and merely ignore the presence of 
biases. Other publications analyze several thousand transactions and lessen the problem 
   	
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t suggest the use of 
benchmark portfolios that have had their new-listing and rebalancing biases removed. 
However, their analysis still finds what they identify as severe misspecification of 
                                                     
5 Clark and Ofek 1994 
6 Lakonishok and Vermaelen 1990 
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parametric tests caused from skewness. Although they find a negative relationship 
between skewness and sample size, their data finds longer time periods increase the 
bias experienced. They conclude their paper by suggesting the use of either a two-group 
test using winsorized abnormal returns or bootstraping7 to provide well-specified and 
more powerful analysis. However, they do acknowledge that bootstrap tests are subject 
to detect more negative than positive abnormal returns during analysis. 
 The fundamental problem with long run event studies is that there are very little 
conclusive insights to be found. Their overall power is seemingly trivial even as power 
has increased in recent years. A primary example is provided by Jegadeesh and Karceski 
(2004) who show that even with an ostensibly large cumulative abnormal returns 
performance (25% over 5 years) in a sample of 200 firms, the rejection of the null 
hypothesis8 is typically less than 50%. Overall, long run event studies appear to be a 
    	 	






2.5 Normal Return Models 
 
 
2.5.1 Normal Return Models 
 Several references have been made to normal return models. In an event study, 
a normal return model is used to calculate the expected or normal returns had an event 
not occurred. There are multiple models that are commonly used in event study 
literature, and each model has its proponents. The three that will be discussed below 
are the market adjusted model, market model, and Fama-French three factor model. 
Before reviewing these normal return models, a mention should be made of the joint 
test problem inherent in all event studies. 
                                                     
7 Bootstrapping in a test or metric involves the practice of random sampling with replacement. 
8 that abnormal returns for this period are zero 
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 In the previous section, it was mentioned that long run event studies are very 
sensitive to model choice. This issue captures one implication of the joint test problem. 
Put simply, the joint test problem stems from the fact that event studies are not just a 
test of whether an event produced abnormal returns, but of whether a particular model 
accurately represents reality. Citing Kothari and Warner (2006) again, the issue is 
summed up by their statement: 
 
While the specification and power of a test can be statistically determined, 
economic interpretation is not straightforward because all tests are joint       
tests. That is, event study tests are well-specified only to the extent that           
the assumptions underlying their estimation are correct. This poses a    
significant challenge because event study tests are joint tests of whether 
abnormal returns are zero and of whether the assumed model of             
expected returns (i.e. the CAPM, market model, etc.) is correct. 
 
The correct (or most correct) model is a contentious issue, and often different 
models offer particular advantages and inevitable shortcomings. In this regard, the 
proper model may be more an issue of which assumptions and limitations a researcher 
is willing to accept. 
 
 
2.5.2 The Market-adjusted, Market, and Fama-French Three Factor Models 
 The market-adjusted model is by far the simplest and most intuitive model for 
normal returns. As the name suggests, it is built on the assumption that the return of a 
company should be the return of the market. Therefore, abnormal returns are just the 
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This model has the advantage of being direct and simple in its assumptions. However, it 
could be critiqued for being too simple. The model lacks complexity or adjustment for 
risk, and most researchers and investors believe that risk drives returns. Therefore, the 
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assumption that all companies should receive the return of the market in a specified 
time period is not considered very realistic.  
 As an alternative, the market model presented by (Brown & Warner, 1980) is an 
attractive alternative to the shortcomings of the market-adjusted model.  Indeed, the 
market model is cited as the most frequently used model for calculating normal returns 
(Strong, 1992). Using a pre-event estimation window it estimates a beta representing a 
stocks reaction to movements in a market portfolio. In this manner it acts to capture 
returns driven by company risk. The notable problem with this, however, is the strong 
assumption that a stock will behave in a static manner to market movements. This is 
increasingly less valid over longer periods of analysis.  
 One of the biggest developments in normal return modeling came in the form of 
the Famma French three-factor model (Fama and French 1993).  By using three 
variables to account for both the tendency of small cap and low price-to-book ratio 
stocks to outperform the market, they provided another method to calculate the normal 
returns in an event study. This three-factor model has been widely praised because of 
the high R-squared (Fama et al 1992). Since its inception, a number of publications have 
made use of its predictive power. Others have altered it in order to account for 
shortcomings it has experienced in its application globally. The model has been argued 
as most appropriate only when used with consideration to local country specific factors 
(Griffin 2002). Foye, Myramor and Pahor (2013) suggest a respecified three factor model 
that utilizes an estimate of accounting manipulation in emerging markets. Although 
noted, these amendments have not been applied to M&A analysis. 
 
 
2.5.3 Regressions upon Abnormal Returns 
Aside from the difficulties relating to calculating abnormal returns and selecting 
a normal returns model, there exists an increasing amount of literature seeking to elicit 
the drivers of abnormal returns using OLS regressions. These publications differ from 
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traditional event studies in that they regress upon the abnormal returns reported by the 
normal return models employed. Although event studies typically test whether 
abnormal returns are significant enough to reject the null hypothesis of non-zero 
returns, it usually does not try to directly link these abnormal returns to industry, deal, 
or company characteristics. Regressing upon the abnormal returns directly allows 
certain factors thought to be driving abnormal returns to be more definitively tested 
and is more detailed in the aim to analyze M&A transactions.  
One such paper showcasing this analysis is provided by Felix Magnusson and 
André Lindberg (2013). Their paper focuses on cross border transactions of Swedish 
firms and evaluates how payment methods impact abnormal returns using OLS 
regressions. Interestingly, they find positive returns to bidding firms are significant when 
the method of payment utilizes a stock option. However, when reviewing target 
abnormal returns their study did not conclude a preference on payment options.  
A clearer insight into M&A abnormal return drivers is provided by Meinshausen, 
and Schiereck (2011).  Their paper covers 192 transactions in the European fashion 
industry. Using the market model and a three day event window, they find significant 
abnormal returns to acquirers. They then regress the calculated abnormal returns on 
financial and transaction variables to further analyze the deals. The regressions they 
report show consistent statistical significance regarding an ac  ROE and market 
capitalization. Not surprisingly, deal value and a binary variable measuring the 
competition surround the deal were also significant. The process of using OLS 
regressions to identify key drivers of abnormal return may be an exciting pursuit, but it 




 A number of publications exist that examine the returns of both target and 
acquirer shareholders. The general consensus of these papers have held that target 
shareholders benefit from transactions while acquirer shareholder experience negative 
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or insignificant returns. This paper seeks to answer whether these generalizations apply 
to niche food and agribusiness based companies as well. 
 In addition to evaluating these transactions and the returns they provide to 
shareholders, the analysis performed in chapter six seeks to elicit drivers of returns and 
quantify their impact. This paper intends to test, verify, and build upon the conclusions 
of prior literature regarding M&A transaction. Furthermore, it intends to focus on the 




CHAPTER 3. DATA COLLECTION SUMMARY 
 The data gathered for this paper comes from three sources. The Thompson-one 
(formerly known as SDC) database is used to identify the merger and acquisition (M&A) 
transactions for analysis. Thompson-one also provides information about key deal 
attributes and allows querying of transactions according to attributes selected by a user. 
The database is a starting place for many studies looking to research large business 
transactions and often supplemented with other business data sets. The Center for 
Research on Security Price (CRSP) and the Compustat dataset are used in this study to 
accumulate additional information regarding the companies and M&A transactions 
selected. Compustat provides substantial financial information for companies in the 
years before and after a transaction, but lacks the observation count for strong analytics. 
Therefore, its role in this research paper is secondary to conclusions drawn from 
Thompson-one and CRSP data. 
 
 
3.1 Thompson One / SDC Database 
The Thompson-one database is set up to allow users to query lists of merger and 
acquisition transactions by several attributes. The database lists details and dates of 
many business events dating back over thirty years. Eight query criteria are used to 
identify the transactions analyzed in this study. This subset of observations was selected 
to maximize the information available regarding the companies involved in each M&A 
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transactions, but the final dataset of useable observations for this study is whittled 
down to just over 200 M&A transactions. This drops slightly further according to 
available data in CRSP. The eight Thompson-one criterion I use are: 
1) Observations are limited to the Thompson-one M&A database. 
2) Observations are limited to disclosed value M&A transactions. 
3) Observations are limited to transactions with a target mid industry listed as 
agriculture & livestock, food and beverage, food and beverage retailing, or 
tobacco. 
4) Observations are limited to transactions with an American acquiring 
company. 
5) Observations are limited to transactions with an American target company. 
6) Observations are limited to transactions with a public acquiring company. 
7) Observations are limited to transactions with a public target company. 
8) Observations are limited to transactions listed as completed or unconditional. 
Many of the query criteria were imposed for intuitive reasons. For example, the 
industry listings were selected to specialize research into four specific food or 
agribusiness sectors. Choosing to analyze only American acquirers who pursue American 
targets provides a standardized market within which transactions occurred. Although 
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rotected than many foreign 
markets. Thus using American companies focuses the research of this paper but rules 
out the possibility significant regulation variation impacting transaction success. The 
concern that varying market regulation can interact with investor returns in an event 
study is evidenced in Bartholy and Flugt (2009).  
The later attribute requirements, from company public status to deal status, are 
applied to select transactions with sufficient data available for the event study and OLS 
regressions performed in chapters 5 and 6. Table 2 shows the final variable dataset 




financial variables are summarized in Table 3 while binary variables are shown in Table 4. 
Several variables are not directly provided by Thompson-one but are instead created 
from data provided by the database. For example, return on assets (ROA) and return on 
equity (ROE) are calculated using the company data reported by Thompson One. 
Relative size and the dummy variables used to identify hostile, competitive, and related 
industry transactions are also generated indirectly from Thompson-one. Because of this, 
some observations are dropped in later regressions when insufficient or missing data 
was provided by Thompson One.  
A descriptive summary of the non-binary variables mean, median, standard 
deviation, minimum, and maximum values are shown in a table format in Table 3. Most 
variable statistics report expected values. For example, target companies were found to 
underperform acquirers on average. Furthermore, the average ROA of target firms was 
lower than both the mean and median acquirer ROA. This may suggest poorly managed 
companies are more likely to become targets of M&A. This notion is supported by 
noting target return on equity averaged a little less than zero. Unprofitable firms may 
find participating in M&A more beneficial to shareholders than continued operation. 
However, overall target observations reported a broad range of values for ROE. This is to 
be expected as many targets were quite small and volatile net incomes may appear 
overdramatized when displayed in percentage metrics. Specifically, target ROE ranged 
from a maximum value of 261% to an equally extreme negative return of -184%. The 
existence of transactions with high ROE targets may indicate that companies can be 
pursued for both under or over performance. 
 Unlike the other financial variables, statistics pertaining to relative size and 
value require greater scrutiny. Because relative size is calculated using acquirer and 
target sales, it is subject to some extreme results9. This phenomenon can be explained 
by transactions involving companies focused on different products. A producer of a low 
                                                     
9 Several large relative size observations were thought to be outliers. Regressions in Chapter six were run 
without them but these observations were re-added after their impact was not deemed significantly 




turnover, high margin product acquiring a producer of a high turnover, low margin 
product would have an inflated transaction size. The definition of relative size in this 
paper is meant to be a proxy of company market size and deal risk but is subject to 
shortcomings. Other measurements of size have similar shortcomings as companies may 
have value in intangible assets or be financially structured differently according to their 
industry, making comparison a prevalent challenge for other considered metrics. 
Reviewing the transaction values at which deals were made, the data lists a mean value 
of $1,030.73 million. This value seems to be inflated by several large transactions. This 
can be inferred from the smaller median of $164.38 million, larger standard deviation of 
$2,914.80 million, and minimum observation of $1.26 million. 
Table 4 highlights the binary variables used in the OLS regressions. Again the 
observations are broken into industry, payment, and deal characteristic groups with the 
observation counts listed to the right. The counts are the number of transactions that 
identify as having the variable be listed as true. These variable groups are identified to 
   	 
        

vary by particular attributes of the transaction. It should be noted that the deal 
characteristics have been tailored to this study. Hostile observations are transactions 
identified by Thompson-one as being such. Competitive transactions are transactions 
with greater than three bidders and are used to designate competitive deals. Lastly, 
related industry transactions are deals where both acquirer and target companies share 











Table 1: Thompson-one Querying List 
Query Criteria Request Operator Description/Code Count 
1 Database Include All Mergers & Acquisitions  n/a 
2 Deal Type 
(Code) 
Include Disclosed Value M&A  305658 
3 Target Mid 
Industry (Code) 
Include Food & Beverage Retailing 
Agriculture & Livestock 
Food and Beverage 
Tobacco  
18511 
4 Acquiror Nation 
(Code) 
Include United States of America  4072 
5 Target Nation 
(Code) 
Include United States of America  3500 
6 Acquiror Public 
Status (Code) 
Include Public  1754 
7 Target Public 
Status (Code) 
Include Public  271 






Table 2: Thompson-one Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Value of Transaction 
($mil) 
The value of the transaction in millions of dollars 
Acquirer ROA Acquirer Net Income / Acquirer Total Assets 
Target ROA Target Net Income /Target Total Assets 
Target ROE Target Net Income/ Target Equity 
Relative Size A transaction size proxy using Target Sales LTM/ Acquirer Sales 
LTM 
Industry Dummy (x3) A binary variable dependent on the targets industry (Ag, Food 
& Bev, Food & Bev Retailing) 
Payment Dummy 
(x2) 
A binary   	

 
   	
 
of stock or cash. 
Hostile Transaction A binary variable denoting whether the transaction was hostile 
Competitive A binary variable denoting whether there were three or more 
bidders for a target company 
Related Industry A binary variable denoting whether the acquiring and target 


















Mean 1030.73 1.25 0.01 0.05 -0.01 
Standard Error 211.46 0.48 0.01 0.00 0.03 
Median 164.38 0.23 0.04 0.05 0.03 
Standard 
Deviation 
2914.80 5.91 0.18 0.06 0.39 
Skewness 5.49 10.02 -2.44 -1.53 0.50 
Range 25051.16 67.69 1.75 0.44 4.45 
Minimum 1.26 0.00 -1.07 -0.24 -1.84 
Maximum 25052.41 67.70 0.67 0.20 2.61 
Count 190 151 171 156 172 
 
 
Table 4: Thompson-one Binary Variables Summary 















17 100% Cash 75 Hostile 9 
Food & Beverage 
Retailing 
89 100% Stock 41 Considerations 
> 3 
42 






3.1.1 Selected Transactions & Data Trends 
The analysis of this paper focuses on transactions in four industries: Food and 
Beverage, Food and Beverage Retailing, Agriculture and Livestock, and Tobacco. 
Acquiring companies were not constrained to any particular industries, but target 
companies were restricted to one of these four. This approach ensured adequate 
observations while still maintaining a food and agribusiness focus. The breakdown of 
each company purchases by each industry is shown in Figure 3. Figure 5 shows the 




purchases of companies were made by agriculture and livestock companies than there 
were sales of companies in the industry. The same is true of tobacco, which listed two 
sales and six purchases. Food and beverage had twenty-two more industry sales than 
purchases. Food and beverage retail had a less significant disparity between sales and 
purchases of 19. Only 29 transactions with companies operating outside of the four 
identified industries purchased public food and agribusiness firms. This represents 
approximately 15% of all transaction and suggests that most M&A occurs among firms 
in closely related industries. 
Figure 4 and 6 are similar to 3 and 5, but display the value of the purchases and 
sales in each industry. One particularly important attribute worth noting is the 
substantial dollar value the tobacco industry represents given the low sales count. This 
is visible in Figure 3. For having only two transactions, over 15% of the total sales value 
belonged to the sale of two tobacco companies. Furthermore, tobacco companies held 
35% of total purchase value. Agricultural transactions appear to have close to the same 
percentage of total value as observation count. Food and beverage companies had 
greater valued transactions on average since the industry had only 42% of the total 
number of sales transactions in Figures 3, but 50% of the sales value in Figure 5. Food 
and beverage retailing, however, had almost 50% of the sales transactions but only 24% 
of the cumulative transaction sales value. This is also demonstrated by their lower 
purchase count, and purchase value in figures 4 and 6 respectively. 
 Table 5 and Figure 7 show the historical waves of M&A transactions in the 
United States and provide a basis for evaluating the scope and limitations inherent in 
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transaction value compared to the cumulative total value of $195,839 million. Several 
years are worth noting due to the substantial number of transactions that occurred (see 
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sixth, and contentious seventh wave. These waves are not particular to the food and 
agribusiness sector but are nonetheless visible in Table 5 and Figure 7. Figure 7 displays 
the number of public and private transactions in food and agribusiness during the years 
of this paper. The fifth wave (1993-2000) is clearly seen as transaction counts peak 
during the mid-90s before returning to lower numbers. Figure 7 was generated using 
transactions reported in Thompson-
    
  	 
transaction of the period. The focus on the purely public segment of the overall 
transaction population shown in Figure 7 has been discussed, but the intention has 
always been to maximize the available data and transparency in each transaction. 
 
 














































































Table 5: Transaction Observations by Year 
Row Labels Count of   
Date 
Announced 





1978 2 749.434 1.1% 0.38% 
1980 1 78.996 0.5% 0.04% 
1981 3 1082.584 1.6% 0.55% 
1982 3 551.6 1.6% 0.28% 
1983 5 619.104 2.6% 0.32% 
1984 5 1532.956 2.6% 0.78% 
1985 6 5408.9 3.2% 2.76% 
1986 10 1154.905 5.3% 0.59% 
1987 5 895.48 2.6% 0.46% 
1988 12 5169.335 6.3% 2.64% 
1989 5 210.31 2.6% 0.11% 
1990 3 42.05 1.6% 0.02% 
1991 4 1899.3 2.1% 0.97% 
1992 4 1762.088 2.1% 0.90% 
1993 3 22.245 1.6% 0.01% 
1994 9 2528.308 4.7% 1.29% 
1995 6 659.055 3.2% 0.34% 
1996 13 4889.358 6.8% 2.50% 
1997 18 9263.074 9.5% 4.73% 
1998 14 15213.229 7.4% 7.77% 
1999 7 5520.819 3.7% 2.82% 
2000 13 59106.023 6.8% 30.18% 
2001 7 5792.425 3.7% 2.96% 
2003 2 313.577 1.1% 0.16% 




Table 5: Continued    
2005 1 34.248 0.5% 0.02% 
2006 4 3602.029 2.1% 1.84% 
2007 5 12743.294 2.6% 6.51% 
2008 2 2355.172 1.1% 1.20% 
2009 4 4433.756 2.1% 2.26% 
2010 1 1162.527 0.5% 0.59% 
2012 2 5598.839 1.1% 2.86% 
2013 2 2861.17 1.1% 1.46% 
2014 7 36723.442 3.7% 18.75% 
Grand Total 190 195839.419 100.0% 100.00% 



















Figure 7: Overall Food and Agribusiness M&A Transactions by Year 
 
LEGEND: The graph above displays the number of M&A transactions broken into four 
sub segments according to the Thompson database. The four segments in the key list 
the status of the acquirer in a transaction followed by the targets status. According to 
this key, the gray bars at the top that are labeled Public Public represent public 
acquirers who perform transactions with public targets. The gray line represents the 
percent these transactions reflect the total M&A count in a given year. Four years have 
had a thicker outline applied to indicate a recession. 
 
 
3.1.2 Transaction Value & Value Groupings 
The transactions studied in this paper are grouped based on industry, value, and 
size. Industry groups are created using Thompson-one industry classifications, but 
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author discretion. Table 6 shows the size classifications and the number of observations 
that fell into each category. The ranges of each size category were determined using 
Figures 8, 9, and 10. The groupings were largely aligned with changes in the rate of deal 
value to observation percentile. 
Figure 8 displays the transaction deal value over the percentile of all 
observations in this study. Transactions in the final category are shown above the 
highest solid line in the graph and consist of seven transactions ranging from $5,000 to 
just under $25,000 million dollars. Roughly 70% of transactions were under $500 million. 
As is evident in the Figure 8, these transactions are drastically larger than the majority of 
observation deal values. 
 Reviewing Figure 9, the third category of transactions is now shown as the 
highest tier. Although it was already clear from Figure 8 that observations in the 
medium value grouping were reporting significantly higher deal values than the other 70% 
of observations, the difference is more strongly noted given the adjusted axes. Likewise 
Figure 10 shows the axes adjusted again to highlight changes in the value to percentile 
rate of the data. The bottom tier held 40% to the transactions with deal values not 
exceeding 100 million.  
 
Table 6: Categories by Value 
Value Category Transaction Value 
(millions) 
Number of Transactions 
Very Low 0-100 77 
Low 100-500 58 
Medium 500-5000 48 










Figure 8: Observation Value over Percentile   All Transactions 
 
The graph above shows observation percentile over deal value. Using the graphics 14-16 
and author discretion, four transaction value groups are defined; very low value, 0-100; 
low value, 100-500; medium value, 500-5000; and high value acquisitions exceeding 
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Figure 9: Observation Value over Percentile   Transactions Less than 5000 Million 
 
The graph above shows observation percentile over deal value. Using the graphics 14-16 
and author discretion, four transaction value groups are defined; very low value, 0-100; 
low value, 100-500; medium value, 500-5000; and high value acquisitions exceeding 
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Figure 10: Observation Value over Percentile   Transactions Less than 500 Million 
 
The graph above shows observation percentile over deal value. Using the graphics 14-16 
and author  discretion, four transaction value groups are defined; very low value, 0-100; 
low value, 100-500; medium value, 500-5000; and high value acquisitions exceeding 
5000 million.  
 
 
3.1.3 Relative Size & Relative Size Grouping 
 The third attribute by which transactions are grouped in this study is relative size. 
It is calculated using the last twelve months of sales of the target company over the 
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Percentiles Over Observation Deal Values - Deals Less than 500 
Million




the riskiness of a transaction. Ideally, this will also help to identify transactions that have 
a market structure or market share impact. For example, a company that acquires a firm 
with the same total sales would be participating in a transaction that is likely more risky 
and perceptively different than a large firm that acquires a small firm with a small 
comparative total sales value. The first firm would be more likely to have to finance the 
acquisition and the impact of the transaction would be much more noticeable both in 
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 Sales have been chosen to approximate the relative size of the transaction, but 
this method is not without limitations. As previously mentioned, the transactions size 
can be distorted when companies focused in different markets or on different products 
interact. Any company that generates its net income through a large volume of low 
margin sales will appear inflated when compared to a high margin low volume producer 
and vice versa. If the data were readily available, company stock would probably be the 
best measure to compare a target to an acquirer. Capital assets, net income, and other 
financial aspects are not used because, like sales, they can vary by industry, product, or 
short run company performance and are thus also subject to distortions. 
 Table 7 displays the number of transactions within each relative size group. The 
data has been broken into three categories. The smallest group includes all transactions 
	   	 	      	    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transactions in this group is roughly double that of the other two. Following the format 
of Figures 8-10, Figure 11 shows the percentiles over the reported relative sizes of the 
transactions. The changes across relative size are not as distinguishable as they were in 
the deal value graphics of figures 8-10. Furthermore, not all transactions are displayed 
with the axes of figure 11. Approximately 8% of transactions reported a relative size 








Table 7: Relative Size Categories 
Relative Size Category Relative Size Number of Transactions 
Low Relative Size 0-25% 80 
Medium Relative Size 25-75% 39 




Figure 11: Relative Size over Percentile 
 
Similar to transaction value groupings, relative size categories are made by author   
discretion after reviewing the graph above. Relative size has been broken into low risk, 
0-25% sales increase; medium risk, 25-75%; and high risk, 75%+. 
 
 
3.2 CRSP / Eventus Databases 
The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) provides the necessary stock 
history and market data to perform the event studies used to evaluate M&A 
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the AMEX, Nasdaq, and NYSE stock markets. CRSP also offers indexes for the evaluation 
of stock returns relative to certain market sector movements.  
Eventus is a software program that pulls data from CRSP to allow users to 
perform event studies quickly and easily. Using a selected normal returns model, 
abnormal returns can be calculated within Eventus. Eventus allows abnormal returns to 
be aggregated according to user preferences, but the general format Eventus reports 
abnormal returns and statistical testing in is consistent. This format is similar to that of 
Table 8. The specific methods to calculate the aggregated abnormal returns are listed in 
Table 8 as well as the significance tests used to test abnormal returns in this paper. The 
actual process of aggregating returns and testing is discussed in the methodology 
section. 
Figure 2 was initially presented in the literature review and displays a graphical 
elaboration on how event studies are conducted. It is now revisited to highlight the 
specific CRSP stock market data Eventus pulls to compute abnormal returns. The Figure 
consists of three windows. The estimation window identified by the time period L1 is 
used to estimate parameters. Normal return models like the market model use prior 
stock data, OLS regressions, and estimated parameters to calculate normal returns 
during the event window. The event window, L2, is the time period during which 
abnormal returns are calculated. The event, in the case of this paper the announcement 
of an M&A transaction, occurs at time T=0. Figure 2 has been tailored to display the long 
and short run time specifications of this paper in Figures 12 and 13. These figures are 
presented in the methodologies section, but the stock price data pulled by eventus is 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Regarding short run event studies, the estimation window for a company in the 
event studies performed in chapter 5 require a minimum of 30 days to a maximum of 
225 days of prior stock price data. This window is used to estimate the beta coefficients 
of the market model discussed in 4.1.1 of the methodology chapter. The OLS estimation 
regressions are restricted to using only market data in the period 30 days prior to the 




sixty days surrounding the event. This paper lists six windows, but focuses on the (0-1) 
day period. Statistical tests are included and vary for short and long run event studies. 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) calculated in the paper are subjected to 
back dating. This means transactions announced during market closures are instead 
dated back to the nearest market business day. For example, transactions announced on 
weekends or holidays would have CAR calculations start the day before the market 
closure and then skip to the next opening of the market for the window (0-1). The 
process of backdating is included to allow for the inclusion of two transactions that were 
announced on a Sunday as well as any transactions that may have occurred before a 
holiday or other market closure. Furthermore, the 0-1 window allows CAR calculations 
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announcement. This window is advantageous because, although the date a transactions 
is announced is known, the time of the announcement is not available in Thompson one 
data. Transactions, then, may be announced after the market closes and thus the day of 




 The long run event studies of this paper require monthly data for a minimum of 
6 months prior to the month before a transaction. A maximum of 36 months data is 
allowed during the estimation window. The event windows for long run studies in this 
paper, requires 37 additional months market price observations. This requirement 











Table 8: Eventus Report Format 
























N for a given 
time period. 
Listed as either 
Cumulative 
abnormal Returns 




(COAR) for long. 






The Patell Z, 
Generalized 
Sign Z, and 
skewness 
corrected T test 
are used and 





3.3 Compustat Database & Company Financials 
Compustat is a database that provides information regarding company financials. 
Using it, many changes in performance metrics during the years surrounding a 
transaction can be obtained. However, the number of companies for which data is 
available is rather limited. Because of this, Compustat financial information is not used 
in regression analysis. However, the availability of seven years financial information for 
   	
  in M&A transactions provides insights too valuable to dismiss. In 
order to add value to the long run analysis of impacts M&A has on acquirer performance, 
the Compustat dataset is analyzed. 
Table 9 displays many company financial metrics available on Compustat. Given 
the low observation count, the inferences of the data in the table should be taken with 
caution. The figure does not show individual company performance, but rather displays 
the percent of the 55 companies for which each financial ratio increased during the time 
period listed at the top. Multiple time periods are compared using different spans of the 
seven years of financial information available. The transaction year is listed as zero in 




conclusions of the paper, but it should be understood that its findings are subject to 
limitations beyond just observation count.  
Data available on Compustat is more common for larger, North American 
companies. Thus the conclusions drawn from Compustat data may be representative of 
only this population. Many of the event study transactions include lower valued firms 
that may have deals not accurately reflected by the fifty-five companies in the 
Compustat database. Furthermore, in order to have seven years financial data the 
companies in Compustat are inherently biased to reflect only transactions that did not 
cause fatal impacts. This may cause financial metrics to appear to be more improved. 
 
Table 9: Compustat Financial Performance Improvement Table 
Financial Ratio Definition - 1 to 0 -1 to 1 - 3 to 0 
vs. 0 to 3  
Averages 
Current Ratio Current Assets / 
Current Liabilities 
43% 41% 63% 
Return On Capital 
Employed 
Profit Before Interest 
and Tax / Average 
Capital Employed 
38% 36% 59% 
Return On Assets Profit after Tax / 
Total Assets 
45% 39% 63% 
Net Profit Margin Profit after Tax / 
Sales 
43% 36% 70% 
Total Debt Ratio Total Debt / Total 
Assets 
66% 66% 70% 
Interest Coverage 
Ratio 
Interest / Profit 
Before Interest and 
Tax 
63% 66% 73% 
Asset Turnover 
Ratio 
Sales / Average Total 
Assets 
32% 34% 55% 
Working Capital Current Assets- 
Current Liabilities 
46% 50% 66% 





CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Event Study Windows and Models 
This paper makes use of two normal return models to calculate the abnormal 
returns of its event studies. The first is the market model. The second is the market-
adjusted model. Short-run studies rarely differ greatly in the abnormal returns reported 
using these models. In long-run studies, additional assumptions made in the market 
model can lead to significantly different abnormal returns from the market adjusted 
model. Table 10 highlights the variables and notations of the models presented in 4.1.1 
and 4.1.2. 
The normal models used are presented in the next two sections, but the specific 
time frameworks used for long and short run event studies are presented first. These 
windows are used in tandem with normal return models to calculate abnormal returns 
that occur during the event window. Figure 12 and 13 display the specific windows over 
which abnormal returns are calculated. The time periods used were briefly discussed 
during the data section and shown again in Figures 12 and 13. Reiterated, the windows 
in the short run are calculated using daily data. In the long run, monthly observation 
prices are used. One exception to the timeline shown in Figure 13 occurs. In one case 
detailed in chapter 5, all windows are pushed back an additional 6 months in order to 




Table 10: Notation Table for Normal Returns 
Notation Definition 
ARjt The abnormal return for company j at time t 
Rjt The real return for company j at time t 
E(Rjt) The expected real return for company j at time t 
Rmt The market portfolio return at time t 
 t Unique company conditions impacting return 
t Portfolio responsiveness to changes in the market portfolio 
jt Error term in an OLS regression for observation of company j at time t 
t1 or t2 Two unspecified moments of time 
 
 












Figure 13: Long Run Event Study Timeline 
 
 
4.1.1 The Market Model 
 The most popular method for calculating normal returns is the market model. 













                   Equation 1 
Here E(Rjt      fffi flffi   fffi ! "
#ff$ff%& 'j ff (j are model parameters estimated using OLS regression and a 
previously decided estimation window. Rmt is the return on the benchmark index. The 
value Rmt is provided by Eventus and is the change in the AMEX, Nasdaq, and NYSE 
ff  $)  $ $ ffff&fi*! +ff&fi,    -jt is included at the end 
of the equation. Once the normal returns for every company j and day t have been 












1                   Equation 2 
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return and the value of the return as estimated by the market model. Its difference is 




4.1.2 Market-Adjusted Model 
The market-adjusted model is the simplest model available for calculating 
abnormal returns. It is incredibly intuitive and its abnormal returns are merely the 
difference between a given stock Rjt     	
     mt. No OLS 







                   Equation 3 
 The simplicity of the market adjusted model and its lack of strong assumptions 
make it appealing to many researchers. Unlike the market model, there is no 
assumption of a static time insensitive company characteristic. Performance relative to 
  		 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4.2 Abnormal Returns 
 
 
4.2.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns CAR 
There are two commonly used measures of aggregated abnormal returns. These 
measures are useful for statistical testing of abnormal returns. The first is found by 
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 1 and t2, a cumulative abnormal return can 
be calculated by summing the abnormal returns between the two moments. By doing 
this over the different periods, cumulative abnormal returns for multiple event windows 















                   Equation 4 
 The cumulative abnormal returns in this paper are tested for significance using 




4.2.2 Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns BHAR 
 Similar to cumulative abnormal returns, buy and hold abnormal returns are 
calculated over a time period t1 to t2. However, unlike cumulative abnormal returns, buy 
and hold abnormal returns are compounded over the time period analyzed. These 




























                   Equation 5 
 Simply stated, buy and hold abnormal returns are the difference between the 
realized buy-and-hold returns and the normal buy-and-hold return of a portfolio Rmt. 
 
 
4.3 Statistical Tests on Returns 
Three statistical tests are used to test abnormal returns calculated in the market 
and market adjusted models. The Patell Z, generalized sign Z, and skewness corrected T 
test are used to identify whether abnormal returns are significantly non-zero. The Patell 
and skewness corrected tests are parametric tests. The Patell is used on short run CAR 
returns, while the skewness corrected is used to test long run abnormal returns. The 
generalized sign Z is a non-parametric test. It is also reported for long run windows. 
 
 
4.3.1 The Patell Test Statistic 
The Patell test is arguably the most prevalent parametric test for abnormal 
returns in event study literature (Patell 1976).  The standardized residual test, often 
referred to as the Patell t-test, tests the null hypothesis that the cumulative average 
abnormal return is equal to zero.  












                   Equation 6 
Here, ASARt is the sum over the sample of standardized abnormal returns and 




Poulsen (1991) elaborate on the Patell statistic and show that, given the lack of an 
event-induced variance increase, the Patell test is well specified and has appropriate 
power. However, they find that     	
   
 	  	
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event date, the standardized residuals test rejects the null hypothesis too often. 
 
 
4.3.2 The Generalized Sign Z Test 
The second test used is the generalized sign test proposed by Cowan (1992). This 
test uses the null hypothesis that, under the assumption of no abnormal returns, the 
number of stocks with positive abnormal cumulative returns would be similar to the 
fraction of positive cumulative abnormal returns from the estimation period of the 
study. When the number is significantly higher, the null hypothesis is rejected and the 
event is said to have had an impact on the returns of the stock. 








                  Equation 7 
where w is the number of stocks in the event window for which the cumulative 

















                  Equation 8 
where mi is the number of non-missing returns in the estimation window for event i and 
Sit assumes either the value 1 or 0 depending on if the firm experiences positive 
abnormal returns during the period. The generalized sign Z statistic mentioned is best 







4.3.3 The Skewness Corrected T Test 
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0                  Equation 9 
where ABHAR(h) is the sample mean of BHARi(h)s, and SBHAR is the sample standard 
deviation of BHARi(h) over the n sample of firms. The characters i and h represent the 
individual BHAR returns for event windows of h months. Lastly, 3   4 	 
skewness coefficient of BHARi(h). The skewness corrected T test is included in long run 
analysis, but is subject to a number of shortcomings. Therefore, the inferences drawn 
from it should be cautiously reported.  
 
 
4.4 Regressions on Returns 
This paper attempts to find the factors that influence abnormal returns of 
acquirers and targets in the food and agribusiness industries through two primary 
methods. First, the event studies are grouped using industry, size, and value subsets. 
Each subset is tested using the Patell and generalized sign z test statistic. The variations 
in the subsets are used to justify exploration into driving factors of abnormal returns 
according to industry, size, deal value, and several other transaction attributes.  
Three sets of OLS regressions are performed on the abnormal returns of 
acquirers in the short run, targets in the short, and acquirers in the long run. Variables 
from Thompson-one are included in the OLS regressions. Their significance is tested 
with the intent of identifying and quantifying impactful drivers of return. Three 
regression models, each with different variable sets, are presented and performed on 
each set of abnormal returns. For clarity, the regression models have been labeled as 
variable sets A, B, and C. The dependent variable is the CAR of short run acquirer or 
target firms as calculated using the market or market adjusted model. However, in the 




BHAR as calculated by the market or market adjusted model. Table 11 displays the 
variables and sets. A     	 
	       	  
  		
      
 			. Asterisks denote variables used in target regression 
sets A, B, and C. The first five variables in Figure 24 are continuous and the last 8 are 
binary variables. Equation 7 lists a general mathematic notation of the OLS regressions 
performed. The symbol  denotes the error term in each OLS regression. 
Y = B0 + B1X1 + B2X2 + B3X3  ff nXn fi fl
 ffi  
Simplicity, intuition, and exploration motivate the three variable sets used in the 
OLS regressions of Chapter 6. Variable set A includes only the continuous variables 
thought to impact transactions. Variable set B was developed according to the 
conclusions of Chapter 5 and the significance cash transactions have held in other 
studies identified in the literature review. Variable set C is used to explore other 
possible driver. Of the three sets, set B will be the focus of many of the conclusions 


















Table 11: OLS Regression Variable Sets 
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CHAPTER 5. EVENT STUDY RESULTS 
The event study results of this paper suggest statistically significant market 
 	    	
	  This is true for both acquirer and target 
shareholders. Market and market adjusted event study abnormal returns remain very 
similar in the short run but deviate in the long run. The short run abnormal returns also 
display an accumulation of abnormal returns in the days leading up to the transaction, 
particularly for target companies. Both acquirers and targets received positive average 
cumulative abnormal returns in the 0-1 event window. Acquirers did not have positive 
mean compounded abnormal returns in the long run. 
The short run abnormal returns of acquiring and target firms will be analyzed 
individually in sections 5.2 and 5.3, but a general overview of the short run returns in 
both the market and market adjusted models is provided first. A list of descriptive 
statistics for the abnormal returns of targets and acquirers in both models is shown in 
Table 12. Multiple event windows and their abnormal returns are discussed in sections 
5.2 and 5.3. The differences in reported abnormal returns between the normal return 
models in the short run are addressed in section 5.5. Long run abnormal returns are less 




5.1 General Short Run Results 
 Concerning the short 0-1 day event window shown in Table 12, target and 
acquirer cumulative abnormal return (CAR) values differ drastically in their spread and 




model for the target and acquirer firm subsets. The difference is further shown by the 
large standard deviation of target returns compared to acquirers. The mean for 
acquirers is slightly positive, hovering just over 0.5% for the CAR of both the market and 
market adjusted return models. However, targets were found to have a mean CAR 
exceeding 17%, a positive value. Both acquirer and target short run abnormal returns 
displayed positive skewness. This can be seen from the larger mean values compared to 
the medians or by looking at the reported skewness levels. Overall, the CAR values 
reported are similar to the returns of other studies. 
Figure 14 displays a list of all the transactions and the weekday they occurred. 
Announcements made on Fridays or before holidays provide additional time for 
investors to process and develop their perceptions given a 0-1 event window. Thus 
these transactions may be different than those that occur at the beginning or midweek. 
However, these transactions are included because Friday was the second most popular 
announcement day and removing these observations would have drastically dropped 
the observations available in the event study. No sizeable trend was found in the 
months of announcement. The range of announcements per month is between 12 and 
22 but averages just over 15. The number of transactions in each particular month is 





























Mean 0.96% 1.04% 17.70% 17.64% 
Standard 
Error 0.58% 0.58% 1.67% 1.66% 
Median -0.22% -0.21% 13.59% 13.76% 
Mode 4.36% 2.24% 10.13% 9.15% 
Standard 
Deviation 7.60% 7.60% 20.06% 20.01% 
Skewness 0.987 0.943 0.816 0.787 
Range 62.72% 61.73% 125.56% 123.73% 
Minimum -27.25% -26.52% -28.17% -27.52% 
Maximum 35.47% 35.21% 97.39% 96.21% 





































Figure 15: Transactions By Month 
 
 
5.2 Acquirer Short Run Event Study Results 
 Figures 16 and 17 display the abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for the 
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announcement. Table 13 displays the cumulative abnormal returns as well as the Patell 
and generalized sign z statistical test for several event windows within these sixty days. 
These tests are performed against either the null hypothesis that abnormal returns 
should be zero or that the number of firms experiencing positive abnormal returns is 
significantly divergent from the market. Table 13 includes the ratio of firms reporting 
positive to negative cumulative abnormal returns for each event window analyzed. 
 Investors often speculate on transactions prior to their announcement (Figures 
16 and 17). On average, these expectations are optimistic as transactions are predicted 
to create more value for the average acquirer than destroy. This is visible from the slight 
upward slope of the cumulative abnormal return lines in both the market and market 
adjusted models. Given the assumption that these models accurately reflect the normal 
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value generation of a transaction as speculated by the market. In the market model, this 
value generation appears to occur as a roughly 2.5% increase in cumulative average 
abnormal returns over sixty days surrounding the event. The market adjusted model 
reports a slightly larger CAR of roughly 4%. These returns are not tested but are 
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 The results of the event study process are shown in the event windows of Table 
13. The last three windows are for the day of the announcement, day after an 
announcement, and both days combined. The window including the day of the 
announcement does not include two weekend transactions. Backdating in this case 

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returns would be calculated. The day of the event is not statistically significant. The day 
after the event is, however, significant for the Patell test at the 0.001 level. The 
combined days are significant at the 0.05 level. The abnormal returns these tests are 
analyzing is listed in Table 13 but are observable in Figures 16 and 17 by the immediate 
jump that occurs at the y-axis. Figures 16 and 17 have other jumps in their axis that may 
be due, in part, to larger market movements that occur over weekends. It is not easy to 
remove this effect without restricting the analysis to only transactions that occur on the 
same weekday and are not backdated.  
 Although all windows report positive abnormal returns, the bottom three 
windows report a larger number of negative observations than positive observations. 
This implies that, although the average cumulative abnormal return is positive for an 
announcement, investors perceive most transactions to be value destroying. Given the 
positive average cumulative abnormal return of all transaction, transactions with 
positive CARs are often larger in absolute value than transactions that experience 














































































Table 13: Acquirer Short Run Abnormal Return Windows 

















(-15,+15) 186 1.82% 97:89 0.679 1.478$ 
(-5,+5) 186 0.99% 97:89 1.216 1.478$ 
(-1,+2) 186 0.79% 89:97 0.799 0.303 
(0,0) 184 0.05% 88:98 0.107 0.157 
(+1,+1) 186 0.91% 82:104 2.787*** -0.726 

















(-15,+15) 186 02.6% 104:82 0.921 2.480** 
(-5,+5) 186 1.34% 102:84 1.551$ 2.186* 
(-1,+2) 186 0.91% 87:99 1.124 -0.018 
(0,0) 184 0.13% 87:99 0.533 -0.018 
(+1,+1) 186 0.90% 85:101 2.663** -0.312 




5.2.1 Acquirer Returns by Size, Value, and Industry 
 Further analyzing the 0-1 event window, Figure 31 displays the returns of 
acquiring firms according to the attributes by which transactions from Thompson-one 
were grouped. The market and market adjusted model CARs are both shown, but the 
statistical tests apply only to the market model. This model is preferred in the short run 
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instead of just the return of the market. The two models provide very similar results for 
most observations and cases of significance for one model are almost always true for 
both in the short run.  
 The first subsection of Table 14 displays the observations according to the 
transaction value groups in which they were categorized. The table lists the average CAR 
of the group for the market and market adjusted models. The largest transaction value 
group reported a particularly high mean cumulative abnormal return and was 
statistically significant at the 0.001 level for the Patell test and the .05 level for the 
general sign z test. However, there are only seven observations in this group, so the 
results should be taken with caution. The smallest valued transactions were statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level for the Patell test and averaged a cumulative abnormal 
return of roughly half what was reported for the largest value group. Low and medium 
valued transactions were not found to be significant in any manner. Medium valued 
transactions were the only group to report negative average CAR. 
 By industry, several sectors were found to be significant. Particularly, food and 
beverage retailing reported a positive market model average cumulative abnormal 
return of 2.49% for 82 transactions. It was statistically significant for the Patell test at 
the .001 level. Food and beverage companies reported a negative market model mean 
cumulative abnormal return of .62% for a similar sized observation count but the CAR 
values were only significant at the .05 level. The sole tobacco observation was 
significant, but the lack of other observations makes generalizing the results to the 




 The last category of observations had a lower number of observations as data 
was not available for all transactions. Only high relative size transactions were 
significant, averaging a market model cumulative abnormal return of 2.04%. The returns 
reported a significance levels of .01 for the Patell and 0.1 for the generalized sign z test 
statistic. The total for all the observations in the event window of 0-1 days is shown at 
the bottom of Figure 31 but was already presented in Figure 30. 
 
Table 14: Acquirer Abnormal Returns By Group   0-1 Day Event Window 
 Acquirer Abnormal Returns By Group: (0-1 days) 




Large 7 4.05% 3.95% 3.983*** 1.955* 
Medium 45 -0.53% -0.62% -1.263 -0.194 
Low 54 0.53% 0.57% 0.639 -0.272 






Ag 16 0.32% 0.40% -0.458 -0.655 
F&B Ret 82 2.71% 2.49% 4.451*** 0.097 
F&B 79 -0.65% -0.62% -2.092* 0.031 





 High 30 2.15% 2.04% 3.017** 1.340$ 
Medium 37 -0.20% -0.18% -0.482 -0.55 
Low 77 0.47% 0.43% -0.012 -0.701 
Total 186 1.04% 0.96% 1.976* 0.303 
 
 
5.3 Target Short Run Event Study Results 
Figures 18 and 19 display the average abnormal and average cumulative 
abnormal return of targets for the market and market adjusted model during the sixty 
   	




cumulative abnormal returns, positive to negative observation ratios, Patell statistic, 
and generalized sign Z statistic for several event windows during this sixty day period. 
Unlike acquirers, the returns for targets are particularly large and significant.  
 Taking a closer look at Figures 18 and 19, a difference between the abnormal 
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apparent. Furthermore, the largest jump in abnormal returns clearly occurs on the day 
of and the day after a transaction. Abnormal returns are largest on the day of the 
announcement and cumulative average abnormal returns level off almost immediately 




relatively transparent value  the price of the deal value. Again, this shift occurs over 
two days in the graphs because transactions may be announced on weekends or too 
late in the business day for market adjustments to occur. 
 Looking at Table 15, there are several important results that should be 
highlighted. All windows were significant for both the Patell and generalized sign Z test. 
The observation count for the window consisting only of the day of the transaction 
drops as two observations occur on Sunday and backdating would not capture the 
impact of the event for this period. Lastly, the most significant Patell statistic occurs on 
the 0-1 window.  
Again, attention should be drawn to the number of positive to negative 
observations for each event window. For targets, the ratio is particularly significant.  
However, according to the models employed, there are still targets who received 
negative abnormal returns in every window analyzed. Reasons for negative target 
abnormal returns are discussed in section 5.5. Still, during the 0-1 window only 22 of a 
148 transactions had negative cumulative abnormal returns. This highlights the notion 




























































 Table 15: Target Short Run Abnormal Return Windows 

















(-15,+15) 148 25.12% 131:17 21.015*** 10.402*** 
(-5,+5) 148 20.68% 127:21 30.800*** 9.907*** 
(-1,+2) 148 18.90% 127:21 45.228*** 9.742*** 
(0,0) 146 12.79% 119:27 58.632*** 8.633*** 
(+1,+1) 148 5.08% 87:61 25.792*** 3.474*** 
(0,+1) 148 17.70% 126:22 59.531*** 9.247*** 

















(-15,+15) 148 25.31% 135:13 20.629*** 11.061*** 
(-5,+5) 148 20.61% 127:21 30.266*** 9.741*** 
(-1,+2) 148 18.82% 127:21 44.814*** 9.741*** 
(0,0) 146 12.79% 119:27 58.484*** 8.631*** 
(+1,+1) 148 05.02% 87:61 25.392*** 3.143*** 




5.3.1 Target Returns by Size, Value, and Industry 
The statistical significance of CARs for target groups during the 0-1 event window 
is clearly shown in Table 16. Almost every group was significant at the 0.001 level. For 
this reason, most differences in this section come from looking at differences in the 
extremity of test statistic significances for each group instead of just general significance. 
As previously noted these test statistics are performed against the null hypothesis that 
no abnormal returns occur during the event window. 
 Looking at the transaction value groupings of Table 16, the largest test statistic 
was reported for medium valued transactions. This was true for both the Patell and 
generalized sign z test statistic. Large valued transactions were the least significant, 
reporting the least positive mean cumulative abnormal return. This group also only had 
six observations to test. Interestingly, small transactions reported average cumulative 
abnormal returns roughly double large transactions and approximately 8% less than low 
or medium valued observations. 
 Industry groupings were again all extremely significant. Food and beverage 
transactions were most statistically significant for the Patell and generalized sign z, 
while the singular tobacco observation was least significant for both tests. The food and 
beverage industry also reported the highest average cumulative abnormal returns of 
any industry. Agriculture and food and beverage retailing trailed by less than 5%. 
 By relative size, medium and low grouped transactions both reported average 
cumulative abnormal returns of approximately 20%. Low valued transactions were the 
most significant for both statistical tests. High relative sized transactions scored the 










Table 16:  Target Abnormal Returns by Group   0-1 Day Event Window 
 Target Abnormal Returns by Group: (0-1 days) 




Large 6 6.58% 6.75% 7.827*** 1.773* 
Medium 45 21.64% 21.77% 53.667*** 6.123*** 
Low 46 20.59% 20.76% 35.825*** 4.965*** 






Ag 13 15.53% 15.63% 16.952*** 3.182*** 
F&B Ret 71 16.02% 16.06% 33.407*** 5.922*** 
F&B 63 20.08% 20.15% 47.727*** 6.304*** 





 High 25 13.05% 13.12% 15.311*** 3.521*** 
Medium 32 20.00% 20.24% 35.905*** 3.815*** 
Low 64 20.10% 20.14% 42.360*** 6.381*** 
Total 148 17.64% 17.70% 59.533*** 9.247*** 
 
 
5.4 Acquirer Long Run Event Study Results 
 
 
5.4.1 Acquirer Long Run Event Windows 
 The results of long run event studies are more complex than short run results. 
Their interpretation and the conclusions suggested from their analysis may not reflect 
reality for a number of reasons. Joint test problems as well as changes in companies, 
markets, and economies make the accuracy of normal returns difficult to maintain over 
longer time periods. The abnormal returns reported by a study have been argued to be 




event. This difference is most notably seen in the mean compounded abnormal returns 
of Table 17.  
 As with the prior two sections, there are multiple windows shown in Table 17. 
However, this time, the windows assume values between -6 to 36 months after a 
  	 
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 buy and 
hold compounded returns for acquirers during each window. The generalized sign Z and 
skewness corrected test are displayed, but should not be given much weight for longer 
windows. The issues with these tests as well as the overall problems associated with 
long term models were discussed in depth during the literature review. 
 Specifically focusing on the first two windows, there is a notable trend in average 
abnormal returns. In the months prior to a transaction, the market and market adjusted 
models report positive abnormal performance. These abnormal returns are significant 
for both the -6 to 0 and -1 to 0 windows according to the generalized sign Z and 
skewness corrected tests for the market adjusted model. The market model reports 
significance for both tests at the 0.05 level for the -1 to 0 window and significance at the 
0.1 level for the skewness corrected t-test during the -6 to 0 month event window. 
Lastly, it should be noted that the -6 to 0 month window displays fewer observations as 
the timeline had to be moved back an additional 6 months to accommodate this 
window and not all observations had data available to meet the requirements discussed 
in Chapter 3. 
 The statistical significance of longer windows is not widely mentioned as it is 
increasingly less reliable. The market adjusted model calculates abnormal returns as the 
difference between the return of a stock and the return of the market. Therefore, the 
mean compounded abnormal return for the -1 to 36 month window of -7.63% for all 
transactions indicates companies who participate in M&A transactions underperform 
the market in the long run. Even without concrete statistical testing, this result suggests 
a negative impact of M&A. This idea is strengthened by the strong abnormal 
performance prior to the transaction as shown in the -6 to 0 window. In fact, these 
results would be 
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     
 




inefficiency and value loss as managers are incentivized to perform detrimental 
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 If the 
majority of stocks in this analysis are low risk, comparison to the market over three 
years might not reflect the true value being received by investors as little consideration 
is given to the security of the investment. However, this explanation seems to contradict 
























 Table 17: Acquirer Long Run Abnormal Return Windows 

















(-6,0) 134 10.15% 78:56> 1.833* 3.980*** 
(-1,0) 140 6.55% 81:59> 1.687* 4.137*** 
(0,+6) 140 4.35% 80:60) 1.518$ 1.824* 
(0,+12) 140 1.10% 66:74 -0.849 0.291 
(0,+24) 140 -3.90% 62:78( -1.525$ -0.622 
(0,+36) 140 -14.17% 50:90<<< -3.554*** -1.679* 
(-1,+36) 140 -7.63% 56:84<< -2.539** -0.78 

















(-6,0) 134 4.94% 70:64 1.227 1.469$ 
(-1,0) 140 5.18% 76:64> 1.699* 2.595** 
(0,+6) 140 -3.92% 56:84< -1.688* -1.365$ 
(0,+12) 140 -17.62% 49:91<< -2.873** -3.422*** 
(0,+24) 140 -81.91% 47:93<<< -3.211*** -3.989*** 
(0,+36) 140 -346.13% 40:100<<< -4.397*** -2.205* 




5.4.2 Acquirer Market Model Returns by Size, Value, and Industry 
 Focusing specifically on the market adjusted model of compounded abnormal 
returns (COAR), there is a wide array of reported value generation. For example, large 
transactions reported a mean compounded abnormal return of over 20%, while low 
valued transactions reported an almost equally negative result. Small valued 
transactions were close to zero, implying the mean compounded abnormal return for 
companies involved in these transactions appears to be very close to the return in the 
market.  
 Regarding the industry sub segments, tobacco no longer has any observations 
with three years of post-transaction data. Agriculture shows market adjusted abnormal 
returns close to 16%. Food and beverage retailing reports very negative and significant 
mean COAR.  Food and beverage transactions list a positive mean compounded 
abnormal return of 6.29%. The abnormal returns shown in this section may be related 
more to industry booms and busts than M&A transactions. This would certainly explain 
the immense range, and consolidation has historically aligned with strong and weak 
economic states. 
 The last section of Table 18 shows the long term abnormal returns by relative 
size. The largest relative size transactions reported the largest mean compounded 
abnormal returns. Low relative size transactions reported a negative mean compounded 
abnormal returns of approximately 12%. These results may reflect the higher risk higher 
reward nature of the market. Relative size is calculated by target and acquirer sales, and 
thus the returns these sub segments have may be driven by this calculation. Low relative 
size transactions may be composed of mostly large, established companies acquiring 
small firms. In contrast, observations with high relative size values may reflect smaller 
riskier business ventures.  
 Overall, the acquirer companies involved in transactions underperformed the 
market by -7.63% over the roughly three year period compounded returns were 
calculated. This result does not support the idea that M&A creates value, but it does not 




returns for industry or risk reasons. To strengthen and provide further meaning to the 
long run returns of acquirers, Chapter 7 provides an analysis of long run performance of 
companies involved in M&A transactions. 
 
Table 18: Acquirer Abnormal Returns by Group- -1-36 Month Window 
 Acquirer Abnormal Returns by Group: (-1 to +36 Months) 






Large 5 11.31% 20.74% -0.343 0.517 
Medium 31 -84.59% -11.60% -0.843 -1.018 
Low 42 -131.40% -18.28% -1.475$ 
-
2.205* 






Ag 12 -40.47% 15.88% 1.094 0.843 
F&B Ret 65 -746.11% -24.90% -3.098*** 
-
2.097* 





 High 20 -108.09% 14.12% -1.605$ 0.374 
Medium 31 -67.69% 6.96% -0.347 0.396 
Low 61 -110.22% -11.97% -2.009* -1.196 







5.5 Model and Return Comparison and Discussion 
 
 
5.5.1 Market Model to Market Adjusted Model 
 Figures 20 and 21 show the market and market adjusted model cumulative 
abnormal returns for acquirer and target observations respectively. The market model 
abnormal returns are displayed using the x axis and market adjusted abnormal returns 
are captured by the y-axis. A 45 degree line has been added to show that neither model 
appears to consistently over or under predict the abnormal returns compared to the 
other during the 0-1 day window.  
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most clearly seen by the correlation of their returns. Regarding the acquirer abnormal 
returns shown in Figure A, a correlation of .997 was found between the returns 
reported by the market model to those reported by market adjusted model. This 
correlation is even stronger for target abnormal returns, which reported a correlation 
value of .999 for the two models. 
 Although these correlations are very high, it should be understood that these 
models deviate from each other quite quickly as the event window length increases. The 
market model predicts normal returns using prior stock price movements, which may 



















to the general market. To assume a particular stock should bear the same risks and 
returns of the market over longer time periods is a strong and often erroneous 
conclusion. Therefore, the similarity between the abnormal returns of the market and 
market adjusted model during the 0-1 window should not be generalized to longer time 
periods. 
 Figure 22 shows the compounded abnormal returns of acquirer companies 
involved in transactions in the long run. The abnormal returns are compounded over the 




that the axes are not the same. The market model reports a number of observations at 
far more extreme values over the near three year period. There are still a number of 
observations that are near the 45 degree line, meaning the two models report nearly 
the same return, but a substantial number of market model observations are 
significantly more negative. Furthermore, the correlation between the returns of the 
two models drops heavily in the long run, coming to a value of 0.589. This difference is 
largely put on the market model as the compounded abnormal returns appear too large 
to be reflective of reality.  
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Figure 21: Short Run Market and Market Adjusted 0-1 Day Target CAR Comparison 
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5.5.2 Target to Acquirer Returns 
 The last two Figures (23 and 24) show the abnormal returns of acquirers and 
targets for the market and market adjusted model during the 0-1 day event window. 
Target abnormal returns are listed on the x axis and acquirer returns are on the y axis. 
The graphs display two main trends.  
First, not every target has positive abnormal returns. Because only public 
transactions are being evaluated, the target stock price should be reflective of the 
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cumulative stock value. It would seem reasonable that a premium should be payed to 
incentivize targets to sell, always leading to positive abnormal returns. These negative 
CAR may be the result of prior speculation by investors. Well telegraphed 
announcements would have a build of target stock price and may be subject to over 
speculation. The announcement and certainty that comes with it would correct this over 
speculation and would show as a negative abnormal return in the event window 0-1 
days. This serves as a possible explanation, but it does not appear that the majority of 
transactions are telegraphed as many announcement events have significantly larger 
CAR for targets during the 0-1 day time period.  
The second notable trend would be the drastic difference between the two 
	 	  	 
 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  	 s to help illustrate this 
difference. The long drawn out observation cluster along the x axis demonstrates that 
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Multiple hypotheses were presented in chapter 1 of this paper. These 
hypotheses are now revisited. The prior analysis suggests several trends occur in merger 
and acquisitions of food and agribusiness firms. Each hypothesis is listed as either being 
rejected or failed to be rejected. The hypotheses are numbered, with an explanation for 
its acceptance or rejection following. 
Hypothesis 1: Average abnormal returns in the short run are zero for acquiring 
     	
	 			
	  
Results: Rejected. The positive mean cumulative abnormal return of .96% for the 0-1 
day event window and its statistical significance at the .05 level according to the Patell 
test suggest acquiring firms do receive positive abnormal returns on average.  
Hypothesis 2: Acquirer subsets will not vary in the short run reported average 
returns according to the relative size, value, and industry characteristics of the 
transaction. 
Results: Rejected. The positive market model cumulative abnormal returns of 3.95% 
and .001 significance for large transactions, 2.49% and .001 significance for food and 
beverage retailing transactions, and 2.04% and .01 significance for transactions with 
high relative size values suggest certain attributes may be correlated with higher or 
lower returns for acquirers in the short run.  




Results: Rejected. The positive mean cumulative abnormal return of 17.70% for the 0-1 
day event window and its statistical significance at the .001 level according to the Patell 
and generalized sign z test suggest target firms do receive positive abnormal returns on 
average.  
Hypothesis 4: Target subsets will not vary in the short run reported average 





Results: Rejected. Although every group reported positive significant values when tested 
against the null hypotheses that no abnormal returns were present in the subsets, the 
variance in statistical significance of CARs according to the Patell and generalized sign z 
suggest the subsets vary from each other. 
Hypothesis 5: Average abnormal returns in the long run are zero for acquiring 
     	
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s announcement.  
Results: Failure to reject. Given the limitations of the generalized sign z and skewness 
corrected T test, the significance of returns is not considered reliable enough. 
Compounded abnormal returns are reported as negative in the long run for both the 
market and market adjusted model, but the dataset studied only underperforms the 
market by 7.64% over three years. 
Hypothesis 6: Acquirer subsets will not vary in the long run reported average 
returns according to the relative size, value, and industry characteristics of the 
transaction. 
Results: Rejected. Using only the compounded abnormal returns reported by the market 
adjusted model for each group, there is substantial variation in returns. However, these 
returns may not be directly related to the transactions. Positive returns in the market 
adjusted model for the food and beverage industry compared to large negative returns 
in food and beverage retailing suggest the industries are different. 
 These hypotheses provide an initial foundation for the impact of M&A. Chapter 6 
and 7 will further develop the analysis of M&A transactions in food and agribusiness. 
Furthermore, these chapters will use more specific characteristics and test particular 
variables for significance. Focus will be on determining the exact impact variables have 




CHAPTER 6. OLS REGRESSIONS ON ABNORMAL RETURNS 
Abnormal returns by group were the focus of discussion in chapter 5, and the 
statistical tests employed have tested the null hypothesis that abnormal returns are 
zero. From the results of chapter 5, it can be ascertained that certain groups do 
experience significant non-  	 
 		  


announcement. This is most evident from the cumulative abnormal returns of target 
firms. Overall, Chapter 5 suggests that both acquirer and target shareholders benefit 
from M&A transactions on average. 
It seems that certain segments of the acquirer and target observations 
experience uniquely significant average abnormal returns. To explore the drivers of 
these abnormal returns and quantify their impact, OLS regression analysis is performed 
in the following chapter. The OLS regressions use the decimal form abnormal returns 
calculated in chapter 5 as dependent variables. The independent variables are also in 
decimal form, thus their coefficients are understood as the impact on returns should the 
variable increase or decrease by 100%. Dividing this coefficient by one hundred gives 
the percentage change a 1% increase has on abnormal returns. The coefficients of 
dummy variables 
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returns. The deal value variable is measured in millions of dollars.  
 
 
6.1 Acquirer Short Run Return OLS Regressions & Models 
 Figure 25 shows six OLS regressions. The figure can be divided into two normal 




regressions is either the market model or market adjusted CAR during the period 0-1 
day event window   	
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of each variable as well as the p-value of their statistical significance are listed. 
Significant variables in each model have been bolded. The variable sets were introduced 
in section 4.4 of the methodology chapter. The focus of discussion will largely revolve 
around the results of regressions using variable set B. 
 The observation count as well as the R-squared of each regression is listed below 
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intuition, or exploration. For example, regressions using variable set A are intentionally 
run using only the most direct variables of this study. Regressions using variable set B 
utilize variables suspected of impacting returns according to the literature review or 
conclusions of chapter 5. Lastly, regressions using variable set C include a number of 
additional independent variables. These regressions are used to explore other possible 
drivers and observe if any major shifts occur in the coefficients or significance of other 
regressions. 
 Reviewing regressions using variable set A in Figure 25, the only statistically 
significant variables are acquirer and target return on assets (ROA). Both of these 
variables are significant at the .1 level. The coefficients are the same for the variables in 
both the market and market adjusted return regressions. Given how similar the 
abnormal returns in each model are in the short run, this result is not surprising (see 
section 5.5.1 for comparison of normal return models). This trend is true for each 
market model with its paired market adjusted variable set equivalent in the short run. 
Interestingly, the ROA variables of acquirer and target firms have negative 
coefficients and 0.1 level significance for almost every regression in Figure 25. Given the 
decimal form of ROA variables in the data, a negative coefficient on target ROA values 
suggests acquirers of more poorly managed assets will not feel as strong an impact from 
the negative coefficient. For example, if a target firm had an ROA near zero the negative 










the summary of variable ranges, standard deviations, and means first presented in table 
3, it is important to understand the impact these variables may have on returns. Target 
ROA had a mean value of .01 and standard deviation of .18, while Acquirer ROA had a 
mean of .05 and standard deviation of .06. At their mean levels, the predicted impact 
each has on abnormal return is very small. The large standard deviation of target 
variables coupled with its range of 1.75 suggest that it may be very impactful in 
determining return. Acquirer ROA has a much smaller standard deviation and no 
reported observations with greater than an absolute value ROA of .25. 
 Targets with lower ROA values may penalize acquirer returns less as it may be 
perceived that there are larger opportunities for value to be generated from better 
utilizing the assets purchased. All other things held constant, negative ROA values in 
target companies would correspond with larger abnormal returns in acquirers given the 
negative coefficient in Figure 25. This would align with the ideas presented by Beitel and 
Wahrenburg (2002) where transactions involving poorly managed targets hold greater 
value generation potential.  
 The regressions using variable set B include only the variables most suspected of 
being influential drivers. This model also reports the most number of statistically 
significant variables. The value of the transaction is significant at the .1 level and the 
coefficient is positive, suggesting the greater the value of a transaction the more likely 
the abnormal returns experienced will be positive. As with models 1 and 4, ROA 
variables have negative coefficients and remain significant. Target ROA, however, has 
become significant at the .05 level and the coefficient is slightly more negative. The 
dummy variables representing a transaction in the food and beverage retailing industry 
and a cash transaction have positive coefficients and statistical significance at the .1 
level. Furthermore, their impact on abnormal returns is more intuitive. A transaction in 
this industry or paid for with cash is suggested to have a 2 or 3% higher cumulative 




 The last two regressions, 3 and 6, report the highest R-squared values. This is not 
a particularly surprising result as they regress on variable set C, the largest variable set. 
Model 3 reports only target ROA as a statistically significant variable, and lists it at  
the .05 level. Acquirer ROA reports too big a p-value to be statistically significant at 
the .1 level in model 3 but drops down to significance in model 6. Target ROA is again 
significant at the .05 level in model 6. These are the only significant variables for 
























6.2 Target Short Run Return OLS Regressions & Models 
 Reviewing Figure 26, the regressions for target abnormal returns for both the 
market and market adjusted model are again shown in the format presented in Figure 
26. Overall, the models estimating the target returns report a higher R squared for each 
variable set regressed upon than for their acquirer counterparts. The variable sets have 
remained the same with the exception that acquirer ROA has been dropped as a 
variable. It does not seem reasonable to regress using a variable inherent to an entity 
outside the target firm and transaction. All other variables have been retained in their 
sets. 
 It is immediately apparent that the variables significant in predicting abnormal 
returns for targets are not the same as those that were significant for acquirers. With 
the exception of the simplest variable set, only dummy variables reported significance in 
target regressions. Models 1 and 4 report relative size of the transaction as significant at 
the .1 level.  The coefficient is negative, implying transactions where the acquirer is of 
similar size offer lower returns to targets. This may be indicative of lower premiums 
acquirers are will to offer given the higher risks that may be associated with transactions 
of this nature. Besides relative size, the constant in these models is positive and 
significant at the .001 level. This significance is maintained at the .001 level for all 
models except the largest regressions 3 and 6. It is not reported significant in models 3 
and 6. 
 Models 2 and 5 regress using variable set B. Again, regressions using this variable 
set report the most number of statistically significant variables. Variables measuring 
whether the transaction was hostile and competitive were significant at the .1 level. 
Both of these variables had positive coefficients, driving abnormal returns up by 19 and 
8 % respectively. Cash transactions had an increase of 9% in abnormal returns 
associated with them and were significant at the .05 level. Models 2 and 5 had a .001 
statistically significant constant. The reported constant value was 15%, an approximate 




 The kitchen sink models reported only one statistically significant variable. 
Hostile transactions had a 21 to 22% increase in abnormal returns for models 3 and 6. 
This variable was significant at a higher level than reported in any other model, dropping 
below the .05 threshold. The value of the transaction variable was notably close to 
dropping below the .1 level and is the only other variable with a mentionable small p-
value. The kitchen sink models shown in regressions 3 and 6 did report the highest R-





















6.3 Acquirer Long Run Return OLS Regressions & Models 
 As previously mentioned, there is some doubt as to whether the abnormal 
returns of the market model and market adjusted model accurately reflect the actual 
impact of a transaction on a firm in the long run. With this understanding, the results of 
OLS regressions upon these returns should be taken cautiously.  
 As with section 6.1, six regressions are presented in Figure 27. The prior sections 
used OLS regressions on CAR returns, and significance mainly varied according to the 
variable sets regressed upon. Long run returns use BHAR as a dependent variable and 
variable significance appears to be most impacted by the normal return model 
employed in the BHAR calculation. Looking at the market model regressions, the 
variable set A regression has three instances of statistical significance. The value of the 
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ROA is significant in all three market model regressions, often at the .05 or less level.  
 High valued transactions may provide better opportunities for companies to 
control markets or capitalize on economies of scale. The negative constant aligns with 
the common narrative that transactions generally destroy value. Reviewing the 
coefficient on acquirer ROA, the strong negative value coefficient is rather unexpected. 
The implication of this is that acquirers with higher ROA suffer lower abnormal returns. 
This could perhaps be indicative of managerial optimism when pursuing an acquisition. 
The market model uses past performance to predict abnormal returns. A company 
operating very efficiently who acquirers a significant amount of new assets may make 
the assumption it can continue to operate at prior levels of efficiency, but not achieve 
this in reality.  
 Given this narrative



















the assumption that certain performance would be maintained. If this performance did 
not occur, the transaction could represent an over expenditure and negatively impact 
























quickly reinvest a large inflow of excess cash, it could be reasonably suggested that cash 
would begin to represent a larger portion of total assets in a company. Even under the 
best circumstances a company cannot hope to get significant interest returns from its 
cash holdings, so excess cash in otherwise efficient companies would actively disguise 
itself as a sign of poor performance. Since lower ROA companies are less adversely 
affected by the strong negative coefficient of the acquirer ROA variable, this possibility 
provides an explanation for an otherwise unintuitive result. 
 Reviewing the market adjusted model, no variables remain significant. This is 
somewhat surprising since the model compares the returns of a company to the returns 
of the market. Since no variables remain significant, it could be suggested that the 
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in predicting the abnormal return of a company three years later. As many of our 
transactions were small in value or small in relative size, they may not be defining 















6.4 Regression Comparisons and Discussion 
 As previously stated, the three regression variable sets have been presented for 
simplicity, intuition, and exploration. Comparing the three models across windows and 
return models bring to light several trends that add support for the conclusions each 
individual normal returns model reports. Their differences also shed light on their 
limitations, particularly regarding the long run regressions using market and market 
adjusted abnormal returns. 
The short run regressions using target and acquirer abnormal returns align with 
each other almost exactly according to the regression variable sets used. The similarity 
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announcement. The regressions on the abnormal returns experienced by acquire
 
reported more significant continuous variables. Target abnormal return regressions 
marked binary variables as being significant drivers of abnormal returns. It does not 
appear that target returns were greatly impacted by t  
  business 
performance. Many of the binary variables in the target regressions represent deal 
characteristics that are not directly controllable or influenced by targets. Target 
regressions reported higher R squared values, although all models did not exceed a 
decimal R squared value of .2.  
Lastly, the differences in significant variables were most notable when 
comparing long vs short run regressions. Long run regressions report a general lack of 
significance and the returns themselves may be dubious. The divergence between 
similarity in the market and market adjusted model appear to cause some variables to 
lose or gain significance. Many of the abnormal returns and their implications in long 








Of the three regression variable sets, the rejection or failure to reject of 
hypotheses will reflect the results of variable set B regressions. The hypotheses were 
first presented in Chapter 1. They are restated below along with an explanation for their 
rejection or failure to reject. 
Hypothesis 7: Acquirer abnormal returns are not significantly impacted by 
industry. 
Results: Rejected. The food and beverage retailing industry was significant at the .1 level 
for the short run regression models 2 and 5 of acquirer regressions. It was associated 
with a 2-3% increase in abnormal returns of acquirers. Industry was not included in the 
reported target regressions and was not found significant in test regressions. 
Hypothesis 8: Acquirer and target abnormal returns are not significantly 
impacted by relative size of the transaction. 
Results: Fail to reject for acquirers and targets. Relative size was not significant for any 
OLS regressions performed on target market and market adjusted abnormal returns for 
variable set B. Furthermore, it was only significant at the .1 level. Given these 
conclusions, it does not seem likely that relative size has a linear relationship to 
abnormal returns.  
Hypothesis 9: Acquirer and target abnormal returns are not significantly 
impacted by deal value of the transaction. 
Results: Reject for acquirers. Fail to reject for targets. Deal value was statistically 
significant for the return of acquirers at the .1 level in the short run regressions on CAR 
values of the market and market adjusted normal return model. Deal value was not 
significant in predicting target abnormal returns.  
Hypothesis 10: Acquirer and target abnormal returns are not significantly 
impacted when the transac  	
  
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Results: Reject for acquirers and targets. Regressions models 2 and 5 of both acquirers 
and targets reported cash transactions as being beneficial to shareholders. Although 




transactions may be correlated with strong company performance in acquirers. Targets 
may prefer cash transactions for several reasons. Cash payment allows investors to 
easily reinvest according to their preference without incurring transaction costs. It may 
also reflect a less risky scenario as the actual merger or acquisition may not occur until 
several months following a transaction. 
Hypothesis 11: Hostile transactions will not have an impact on the returns of 
targets. 
Results: Rejected. The hostile transaction variable was statistically significant for target 
regressions at the .1 level for the short run regression models 2 and 5. It was associated 
with a 19-20% increase in abnormal returns of targets in the short run. This suggests 
that acquirers often pay heavy premiums during hostile transactions.  
Hypothesis 12: Target abnormal returns are not significantly impacted when 
multiple bidders are present. 
Results: Rejected. Competitive transactions reported a 8% increase in abnormal returns 
for targets in models 2 and 5. This makes sense as bidders may continue to drive up the 
premium associated with the transaction, allowing targets to extract more if not all the 
value in the merger or acquisition. 
 These hypotheses are made with consideration to short run abnormal returns. 
The lack of credible significance in long run regressions make definitive statements 
difficult to justify. Chapter 7 reviews financial performance of acquirers in the long run 




CHAPTER 7. LONG RUN PERFORMANCE CHANGES 
 To elaborate and shed light on the impact of M&A in the long run, chapter 7 
analyzes financial ratios of acquirers in the years following a transaction. Using the 
Compustat data and financial performance metrics discussed in chapter 3, pre-
transaction company performance for 55 firms is compared to post transaction 
performance. The results are not statistically tested, but display possible trends in the 
financial performance of acquirers following M&A transactions. 
 
 
7.1 Performance Increases or Decreases 
Table 8 (displayed in chapter 3.3) shows a number of performance metrics and 
their definitions. The three furthest right columns display the percent of the fifty-five 
observations that had a metric increase in value over the time period -3 to 3 years. Note 
that these are metric increases and not necessarily performance improvements, as a 
rise in the total debt ratio is not considered a financial improvement. 
 Looking at the first of the three most right columns, the changes in company 
performance from a year prior to a transaction to the transaction year are shown. Year 
zero is the year of the transaction. Metrics reporting less than 50% show a greater 
percentage of firms reporting a lower value post transaction. For example, the current 
ratio, return on capital employed, return on assets, net profit margin, asset turnover 
ratio, and working capital are all lower than 50% for -1 to 0 years. Interestingly, the last 
column, which shows the average of three years prior transaction to the average of 




there may be an initial hit to performance but that long run performance benefits. 
 Several metrics are above 50% in the -1 to 0 year time frame. Total debt ratio, 
interest coverage ratio, and return on equity all have a higher percentage of firms 
reporting an increase in the metrics value during the 0-1 time period. These percentages 
increase in reported value over longer time periods, as indicated from the two rightmost 













70% suggest that most companies take on larger debt obligations in the years following 
a transaction. This would be expected in the -1 to 0 column, but its occurrence over 
longer time periods suggests a detrimental effect of M&A. 
 
 
7.2 Performance Metrics Over Time 
 The data used to create Table 8 has been graphically displayed in Figures 28-31 
using individual observations. The graphs shed light on the changes in performance of 
companies regarding current ratios, asset turnover ratios, total debt ratios, and return 
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across time, with the metrics value before a transaction shown on the x axis and its post 
transaction value shown on the y axis. This allows the shift in performance for all 
observations as a whole to easily be viewed and analyzed. 
 Looking at the first graph, Figure 28 shows the current ratio changes after a 
transaction. The first thing to note is that 45 degree line shows which observations have 
improved and which have deteriorated. Every point below the line has a higher prior 
current ratio than post transaction. Likewise points above the line express the opposite 
trend. Points on the line represent no change in reported performance. Gray dots show 
a comparison the current ratio prior to a transaction to the value three years after the 
transaction. Black points use three years of reported current ratios post transaction 




no strong conclusions that can be drawn. Black dots appear to be more centered on the 
line, an expected result given it utilizes a three year average. 
 Figure 29 displays the change in asset turnover. Unlike Figure 29 several key 
characteristics of the data are visible. More observations lie below the 45 degree line. 
Furthermore, the further an observation lies from the origin the more likely it is to lie 
farther below the 45 degree line. Intuitively, this suggests that high turnover firms that 
acquire have difficulty utilizing the newly acquired assets as efficiently as it utilized its 
own assets prior to the transaction. Firms that reported a lower turnover in the year 
prior to a transaction still report this performance decrease but the severity is less 
extreme. This is inferred from the close proximity of observations to the 45 degree line 
nearer the origin. 
The third graph, Figure 30, displays the total debt ratio. The results of this graph 
are clearer than the prior two and suggest a more negative implication of M&A. As 
evident from the graph, a majority of the observation points lie above the 45 degree line. 
It is very clear that debt levels have risen for most acquirers three years after a 
transaction. Most observations that are below the 45 degree line are not significantly 
below it. Several transactions above the line are significantly so, and the debt level of a 
number of companies have close to doubled. Although it should be expected that the 
amount of debt would increase after a transaction, the company should be acquiring 
assets as well. To see the debt level rise so notable and remain higher after three years 
is troubling. 
 The last graph, Figure 31, displays the return on equity of firms in the years 
before and after a transaction. This is perhaps the most troubling graph, as it shows a 
rather disturbing possibility. Note that the range on the y-axis is significantly larger. In 
particular, it includes far more negative values. Although a good deal of observations 
surround the 45 degree line, a number of firms report a decrease in ROE following a 
merger or acquisition. More concerning is the fact that the decrease appears to have 
the potential to be drastically negative. Although this decrease in ROE could be caused 




debt obligations eroding income of equity holders. If this is the case M&A transactions 
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The hypotheses listed below were first addressed in Chapter 1. They are not 
statistically tested, but revolve around the observable trends of acquirers according to 
graphical analysis. They are restated below along with an explanation for their 
acceptance or rejection. 
Hypothesis 13: Acquirer current ratios are decreased in the long run. 
Results: Inconclusive.  After reviewing Figure 28, there does not appear to be a clear 
trend to changes in the reported acquirer current asset ratios post transaction.  
Hypothesis 14: Acquirer asset turnover are decreased in the long run. 
Results: Accepted. From Figure 29, it seems clear that asset turnover has decreased in 
the years following a transaction. This is evident by the majority of observations below 
the 45 degree line. It appears that larger return on asset ratios prior to a transaction are 
more visibly lowered in post transaction years. 
Hypothesis 15: Acquirer total debt ratios are decreased in the long run. 
Results: Rejected. From Figure 30, a clear number of observations report higher debt 
ratios in the years following a transaction than lower ratios. Not only are many firms 
reporting larger total debt ratios, but they are reporting significantly larger debt ratios. 
The post transaction values are often much higher than pre transaction. This suggests 
firms are not benefitting from M&A transactions.  
Hypothesis 16: Acquirer return on equity are decreased in the long run. 
Results: Accepted. The motivation of M&A should be to generate larger returns for 
shareholders in the long run. Unfortunately, Figure 31 suggests that most acquiring 
firms did not experience increases in return on equity following a transaction. Even 
more alarming, several firms experienced significant negative ROE values in the years 
following a transaction. This may be caused from increase debt and interest obligations 
eroding income from businesses.  





notion that M&A destroys value for acquirers. However, this section makes the 
conclusion that the three years following a transaction adequately capture the long run 
impact of M&A. Strategic M&A may not provide payoffs to shareholder over the 




CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 
 The general conclusions of this paper have been broken into two segments 
below. Short run conclusions and long run conclusions are addressed individually and 
then discussed in relation to each other. Lastly, future research focuses and topics of 
interest are suggested in the last section.  
 
 
8.1 Short Run Impact of M&A   Acquirers and Targets 
 In the short run, M&A transactions are found to be beneficial for both acquirer 
and target firms on average. Analyzing the market response to the announcement of a 
transaction, non-zero positive mean abnormal returns were found using both the 
market and market adjusted normal return models for both parties involved in the 
transactions studied. Acquirers averaged an approximate 1% cumulative abnormal 
return over the period studied, while targets reported a value nearer 17%. Although 
average abnormal returns were positive for acquirers, the majority of acquiring 
companies reported negative cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the 
announcement of a transaction. 
 Deal value, acquirer ROA, Target ROA, cash payment, and food and beverage 
retailing transactions were found to be statistically significant impactors of short run 
acquirer returns. Acquirer and target ROA had negative coefficients while the other 
three variables had positive coefficients. These returns were driven by market 
perceptions regarding the deals and not their later consequences. Target ROA was the 
most statistically significant driver for acquiring firms. The significance of ROA in 




performance differences between companies involved in a merger or acquisition. 
Specifically, lower performing companies appear to be perceived by investors as having 
large opportunities for the acquirer.  
 Cash payment, deal attitude, and competition were statistically significant 
variables driving returns in target companies. The three variables had positive 
coefficients in the OLS regressions performed. Cash transactions were most significant 
while hostile transactions were associated with an increased 20% abnormal return to 
target firm shareholders. Financial variables were not significant to target firms. This 
suggests the negotiated terms of a deal are more likely to determine the extremity of 
abnormal returns experienced by target shareholders.  
 
 
8.2 Long Run Impact of M&A -- Acquirers 
 According to the market model, acquirer shareholders suffer significant losses in 
the long run. However, joint test problems and boom bust cycles make the results of the 
market model difficult to analyze. The market adjusted model suggests acquiring firms 
provide shareholders mean compounded abnormal returns 7.6% less than the market 
for the companies studied. This value does not factor in intrinsic company risk. 
 Regarding the long run financial performance ratio changes in acquirers, the 
results are rather discouraging. Most clear changes in performance following a 
transaction suggest a negative long run impact. Firm asset turnover ratios, debt to 
equity ratios, and return on equity appear far more likely to decrease in the years 
following a transaction. Return on equity particularly seems prone to drastic decreases. 
This may be indicative of loss from unrealized market or performance gains made during 
the negation of the transaction.    
 The long run analysis of chapters 6 and 7 suggest an overall detrimental nature 
to M&A for acquirers. This coincides with much of the general consensus on the topic. 




reflective of positive abnormal returns in short run analysis may be rooted in the same 
ideas that prompt firm managers to pursue M&A. 
 
  
8.3 Further Research 
 There are limitations to the research conducted in this paper. Future researchers 
may wish to give consideration to multiple findings not deeply addressed in this paper 
as well as explore several briefly touched topics. Lastly, future research may wish to re-
analyze and revisit the conclusions of this paper pending the development of new 
techniques, theories, and analytical tools. 
 Future research will hopefully be able to more powerful detect the abnormal 
returns linked to M&A. Current abnormal returns are calculated with normal return 
models that may not be sensitive enough and may be influenced by other events or 
factors. Just as the CAPM model has lost much of its former prominence as a normal 
returns model of event studies, new models may provide better analysis in the future. 
This may already be occurring as the Fama-French three factor model increases in 
popularity among researchers. 




     
	 
	
stronger statistical significance testing of long run abnormal returns. Contemporary 
tests are fraught with shortcomings, leaving most of their analysis subject to skepticism. 
However, unlike normal return models, there are no notable potential solutions to the 
obstacle of long run abnormal return testing. 
 The analyses of the chapters above has cast a wide net. Reviewing both 
acquirers and targets has allowed a general analysis of the food and agribusiness 
industries, but future papers may wish to focus on specific populations within food and 
agribusiness sector. There may be trends specific to food and beverage, food and 
beverage retailing, agriculture and livestock, or tobacco firms that require a more 
focused analysis. This could include a more focused analysis of specific industry 




industry has particular idiosyncrasies and nuances that may be worth researching. 
Specifically, risks in production may impact the industry as unpredictable factors such as 
droughts, diseases, and policy changes can drive industry consolidation. This extends 
into food and beverage production companies as changes in competition for inputs may 
prompt vertical integration of the supply chain. The unique characteristics of subsectors 
may be particularly valuable to businessmen.  
Lastly, a foundational set of variables impacting abnormal returns are 
established in this paper, but future research may wish to test other company attributes 
or deal characteristics.  Better proxies for relative size may come from new datasets and 
the seventh wave of M&A may provide new data points for analysis. Ideally, this paper 
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